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Introduction 
Social protection targets poor and vulnerable individuals to reduce poverty and 
promote equality of opportunities and social inclusion. These policies and 
programmes are implemented by governments, with the possible financial and 
technical support of international organizations. Social protection programmes are 
gaining an increasing role in the governments’ poverty reduction strategies and, over 
the past decade, an “impressive extension of social protection coverage” (ILO 2014) 
and a strong increase in the number of social protection programmes in place 
(Gentilini et al. 2014) have been observed. The increasing implementation of these 
kinds of interventions is due to the fact that social protection programmes have 
proven to be essential instruments for reducing hunger and income poverty and 
breaking the poverty trap (ODI 2011; Bastagli et al. 2016). According to a recent 
review by Bastagli et al. (2016) most of the programmes positively and significantly 
affect children school attendance, uptake of health services, dietary diversity, small 
livestock ownership while less clear-cut evidence was found about the impact on 
children learning outcomes, anthropometric outcomes, business and enterprises, 
agricultural and non-agricultural productive assets ownership, employment and 
migration. Additionally, several studies highlighted other unintended programmes 
effects. Despite the rapid expansion of these interventions, governments still 
underinvest in social protection and only 45% of the global population is covered by 
at least one programme (ILO 2017).  
Social protection can be provided through contributory programmes (social 
insurance and social security schemes) or non-contributory programmes (social 
assistance and labour market programmes). The focus of this thesis is on a specific 
type of non-contributory social assistance programme.  More specifically, we analyse 
Juntos, a conditional cash transfer programme implemented by the Government of 
Peru in 2005. Conditional cash transfers aim at acting on both short-term poverty, 
through the injection of liquidity within the household, and inter-generational long-
term poverty, through conditionalities related to education and health. Juntos 
succeeded in reaching its main objectives reducing poverty, increasing the utilization 
of health services, improving nutritional intake and increasing attendance in primary 
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education (Perova and Vakis 2009). However, the unintended impacts of Juntos are 
still unexplored in the literature.   
In the line of Deveurex and Sabathees Wheeler (2004) framework, conditional cash 
transfers may be seen as “protective measures” aimed at providing relief from 
poverty. However, the empirical evidence highlighted also their unintended 
“preventive” effect on deprivation through risk diversification, their “promotive” 
positive effects on economic opportunities and, more recently, their “transformative” 
role for socially marginalised groups. These effects of conditional cash transfers are 
at the core of this dissertation. The thesis is composed of three chapters where we 
explore, relying on impact evaluation techniques, whether Juntos may produce 
unexpected preventive, promotive and transformative effects, by acting on 
households’ investments, migration and children aspirations.  
The first chapter focuses on the impact of the Juntos programme on households’ 
investments in productive assets and activities. To this regard, conditional cash 
transfers have not only a “promotive role” that allows households to improve real 
income (Deveurex and Sabathees Wheeler, 2004), but even a deeper “production 
role” which allows them to invest, by relaxing liquidity constraints and providing 
consumption and assets security (Barrientos 2012). Additionally, assets 
accumulation may represent an insurance for households in case of shocks, hence in 
this case the “promotive” and “preventive” effects of conditional cash transfer, on 
productive assets, overlap (Deveurex and Sabathees Wheeler 2004). 
The second chapter analyses the impact of Juntos on domestic migration. Currently, 
migration is at the core of the international debate and represents a huge challenge 
for Peru and for the entire world2. Migration may have a “preventive” role for the 
household since it is a form of risk diversification. The chapter analyses whether the 
presence of a social protection intervention in the place of origin affects domestic 
migration from rural to urban areas.  
The third chapter focuses on the “transformative” role of conditional cash transfer. In 
particular, we analyse whether Juntos affects children aspirations related to 
education and work, which are proved to be important predictors of actual 
                                                          
2 In 2013 at the global level there were approximately 763 million of internal migrants (Bell and 
Charles‐Edwards 2013) and 232 million of international migrants (UN 2013) 
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educational outcomes. This paper contributes to the recent and scarce literature 
about the psychological effect of social protection intervention and the role of 
aspirations in poor settings. 
In the three chapters we implement three different impact evaluations. In absence of 
a randomize control trial experiment, to remove the selection-bias due to observable 
characteristics we rely on quasi-experimental techniques calculating the probability 
of the household to be selected by the programme. However, to assess the programme 
impact, in each chapter we rely on different impact evaluation techniques due to the 
nature and availability of data on the outcome variables3. In the first chapter we rely 
on the combination between Propensity Score and difference in difference technique. 
In the second chapter, due to the dynamic nature of the dependent variable and the 
way it was built, we rely on Propensity Score Matching and then we calculated the 
programme impact relying on Average Treatment effect on the Treated using 
different matching algorithms. In the third chapter, because of data constraints and 
analysis objectives, we use Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) and Ordinary Least 
Squares models. The choice was motivated on different grounds: first, we do not have 
information about the outcome variable in the pre-programme period and we cannot 
perform a difference-in-difference analysis; second, we prefer IPW to traditional 
matching algorithms since the size of the sample with available information on the 
outcome variable was not as large as the ones of the other papers and because IPW 
shows several practical advantages in assessing the heterogenous effects and 
studying the role of covariates which was relevant in the case of this chapter’s 
objectives. 
There are three factors that motivated the research questions developed in this thesis. 
First, conditional cash transfer programmes have limited duration for beneficiaries 
and are not meant to cover individuals for the whole life cycle. Available data do not 
always allow to conduct studies on the long-term effect of social policies. Therefore, 
studying whether conditional cash transfers may have a “promotive” and 
“transformative” effect can shed a light on this issue and provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of government expenditure in the long run.  
                                                          
3 To develop the empirical analysis, we rely on the longitudinal Young Lives data and for each chapter 
we focus on different database sub-sections concerning households, individuals and children. 
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Second, assets investments, migration and aspirations have strong consequences in 
terms of poverty and social changes. Indeed, both investments and migration, can be 
considered risk-coping strategies: assets accumulation may act as an insurance for 
future consumption in case of bad economic conditions (Zimmerman and Carter 
2003), while migration generates income sources differentiation for the household. 
In developing countries, households are highly exposed to risk and vulnerability and 
often face liquidity or credit constraints. Given the lack of means to deal with these 
issues, households may put in place ex-ante and ex-post risk coping strategies (such 
as: savings, assets accumulation, migration and income sources differentiation). 
There is an increasing evidence about the fact that the lack of means for coping with 
risk and shocks may be itself a cause of persistent poverty (Dercon, 2006) and that 
some risk coping strategy, as livestock and productive assets sales or school drop-out, 
may be highly detrimental in the long-run (FAO 2013). Other strategies, as domestic 
and international migration, may imply huge social changes and have implications in 
terms of poverty reduction (see Imai et al. 2017). At the same time, a recent strand of 
the economic literature showed that individual aspirations are correlated with effort, 
investments and real outcome (Ray 2006; Serneels and Dercon, 2014; Chiapa et al. 
2012) and that low individuals’ aspirations about future opportunities may lead them 
to remain trapped in poverty, creating a vicious cycle (Ray 2006). Since the way risk-
coping strategies and aspirations are formed may determine important consequences 
in terms of poverty, it is relevant to analyse to what extent conditional cash transfers 
may affect these dimensions.  
Third, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies about the impact of Juntos 
on productive assets and activities, on households’ migration and on children 
aspirations.  
This thesis shows that the Juntos programme is able, not only to deter domestic 
migration from rural to urban areas, but also to allow beneficiary households to invest 
in productive assets and activities. Additionally, the programme has also a 
psychological effect on beneficiary children who have higher aspirations about their 
future studies and work.  
Social protection programmes are not substitute for economic growth and structural 
policies, but they can support poor households in accessing available services and 
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break the inter-generational transmission of poverty (Giovannetti et al. 2010). From 
a policy perspective, the positive promotive and transformative effects of conditional 
cash transfers highlight the importance to support households through these 
interventions and show that the initial government investments may be boosted by 
the household capacity to make the most of the money received and by psychosocial 
changes which allow beneficiaries to choose freely where to live and to aspire without 
constraints.    
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Chapter 1  
Do Cash Transfers Trigger Investments?    
Evidence from Peru 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter provides an impact evaluation of the Juntos program on households’ 
decisions to invest in livestock and agricultural and non-agricultural assets used for 
income generating activities. Using Propensity Score Matching and Difference-in-
Difference techniques, we show: i) that beneficiaries are significantly more likely to 
invest in productive assets and activities with respect to non-beneficiaries; ii) that Juntos 
is more likely to relax liquidity constraints rather than to be used as an insurance for 
risky investments; iii) that the program benefits the poor but not the poorest of the poor. 
Duration and transfers regularity do not produce significant differences between groups 
of beneficiaries. However, results show a sustained impact of the program over time.  
  
 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfers; Impact Evaluation; Households Investments; Peru; 
Juntos. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past five years, the number of social assistance programmes in developing 
countries has almost doubled with every country having at least one social assistance 
programme in place (Gentilini et al. 2014). When implemented in a sound 
macroeconomic environment, social assistance programmes, and, in particular, cash 
transfers, are important instruments for reducing hunger and income poverty and 
breaking the poverty trap (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2011). In the past, social assistance 
programmes were seen as a mere emergency relief for dealing with climatic shocks, 
famines and conflicts; more recently their promotive and transformative role 
(Deveurex and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) and their long-term impact on productivity 
and living standards has been increasingly recognised.  
The economic rationale for cash transfers was first identified by Fizbein et al. (2009): 
cash transfers (hereafter CTs) may reach the poor, reduce poverty and redistribute 
more with respect to other forms of untargeted public expenditure. Moreover, in case 
of imperfect credit markets, CTs may allow also credit-constrained households to 
efficiently allocate the capital within the economy. Finally, CTs, in case of income 
fluctuation and imperfect insurance markets, may support households in smoothing 
consumption. The main objective of unconditional CTs is to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability, while conditional cash transfers (hereafter CCTs) are designed to affect 
also health and education outcomes. However, beside the intended impacts, both 
conditional and unconditional CTs may produce several unintended effects such as, 
for instance, changes in households’ investment decisions.  
Barrientos (2012) shows that cash transfers may have a productive role for 
beneficiaries at the microeconomic and local level through three channels: relaxing 
credit and liquidity constraints; providing consumption and asset security; allowing 
household to optimally allocate resources. 
Indeed, cash transfers increase the household income relaxing liquidity constraints 
and, when regular and predictable, support households in investing in risky but high-
return activities. The idea is that beneficiaries use the transfer for immediate 
consumption and to pay the transaction costs the household incurred in to get the 
transfer. In the case of conditional cash transfer, a fraction of the transfer may be 
devoted also to activities required by the programme. Then, the remaining amount 
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(after immediate consumption, transaction costs, and activities related to the 
programme, if any) can be used for saving or as a collateral to borrow. CTs are not 
meant to cover the individual for the whole life cycle and often they have a limited 
duration. Hence, households may decide to invest the saved amount in productive 
assets and activities. The investment in productive assets is one of the channels 
through which beneficiaries can maintain the living standards reached thanks to the 
programme also after its termination. Even though assets accumulation may come at 
the expenses of current consumption, it represents an intertemporal defensive 
strategy for poor households since assets accumulation may act as an insurance for 
future consumption in case of bad economic conditions (Zimmerman and Carter 
2003).  
We investigate whether the Peruvian programme, Juntos, has an impact on 
households’ investment in productive assets and activities. More precisely, we 
analyse the programme impact on agricultural and non-agricultural assets (used by 
the household for income-generating activities) and on livestock. Moreover, we 
inquire whether specific programme design and implementation features, such as 
programme duration and regularity of payment, produce different effects on 
investments.  
The objective of this paper is to produce an impact evaluation of the Juntos 
programme in Peru and contribute to the empirical evidence about the productive 
role of cash transfer programmes. To our knowledge, this is the first impact evaluation 
of Juntos which focuses on agricultural and non-agricultural assets used specifically 
for income generating activities. Also, Del Pozo and Guzmán (2011) analyse the 
productive role of Juntos but their focus was mainly on land and livestock ownership. 
Additionally, we investigate whether the main programme mechanism is to relax 
liquidity constraints or to provide an insurance for risky investments.  
Investigating the productive role of cash transfers is relevant because in developing 
countries, governments still face several constraints to finance, design and implement 
social assistance programmes and these interventions are designed to have a limited 
duration for beneficiaries. Identifying the determinants that may influence impact on 
investments and on living standards is crucial to properly design interventions and to 
maximise their long-term impact on the targeted population.  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature about the productive impact of cash transfer programmes in developing 
countries; Section 3 describes the Juntos programme in Peru; Section 4 describes the 
data; Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and shows the descriptive statistics, 
the identification strategy and the methods; Section 6 shows and discuss the results; 
Section 7 presents robustness checks; Section 8 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
The interest on the impact of social transfers on productive assets and activities is 
recent but several studies have already addressed the issue of under which conditions 
cash transfer affect households’ investment decisions. According to a recent literature 
review (Bastagli et al. 2016), most of the studies on the impact of cash transfers on 
livestock and agricultural asset ownership show positive and significant effects. 
Conversely, the evidence on non-agricultural assets impact is still mixed.  
Indeed, according to Daidone et al. (2014b), in Lesotho cash transfers have a negative 
effect on non-agricultural assets ownership while Asfaw et al. (2014) and Blattman et 
al. (2012) find the opposite for Kenya and Uganda. An explanation for these 
differences could be due to the programme design, since the Ugandan programme 
was specifically designed to invite beneficiaries to invest in income generating 
activities.  
For what concerns agriculture, the effect of unconditional cash transfers on livestock 
ownership in several Sub-Saharan African countries is positive and significant 
(Covarrubias et al. 2012; Daidone et al. 2014a; Blattman et al. 2014; Evans et al. 2014; 
Asfaw et al. 2014), also in case of environmental shocks (Merttens et al. 2013), but 
there is not a clear-cut evidence on the impact of unconditional cash transfer on 
agricultural and non-agricultural assets ownership4.  
The existing empirical evidence on households’ ownership of other agricultural assets 
is mixed. According to Berhane et al. (2011), Covarrubias et al. (2012), and Daidone 
et al. (2014a) in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, agricultural assets are 
positively and significantly affected by unconditional cash transfers; while according 
                                                          
4 It is worth noting that most of the literature about the productive role of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa was developed within the FAO “From Protection to Production” project. 
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to Pellerano et al. (2014), Merttens et al. (2013), and Gilligan et al. (2009) in other 
countries this was not the case. Merttens et al. (2013) explained the absence of an 
impact with the lack of arable land in targeted HSNP Kenya districts, while Pellerano 
et al. (2014) argued that the lack on an impact in Lesotho was due to the fact that the 
programme explicitly suggests spending money for children even though the transfer 
was unconditional. However, there is not experimental evidence about the fact that 
conditionalities or messages associated to the transfer may produce different effect 
on households’ investments with respect to traditional unconditional cash transfers. 
For instance, in Latin America most of the cash transfers are conditional on 
requirements related to health and education and this leads beneficiaries to allocate 
part of the transfer to comply with them. Nevertheless, also in these cases, 
programmes allow beneficiary households to invest in livestock (Todd et al. 2010; 
Veras Soares et al. 2010; Gertler et al. 2012; Del Pozo and Guzmán 2011). Also, in Latin 
America the impact of cash transfers on non- agricultural assets is mixed. Gertler et 
al. (2012) find a positive and significant impact on non-agricultural assets used for 
micro-enterprise activities. Conversely, Maluccio (2010) finds a negative impact of 
conditional cash transfer in Nicaragua and justify it with the fact that in rural areas, 
where the programme operates, there are poor infrastructure and the micro-
enterprise activities produce too low marginal returns. However, Maluccio (2010) did 
not find programme effect for beneficiaries on other assets either and explained this 
finding maintaining that the marginal propensity to consumption was close to one, so 
that people tend to use the whole transfer for current consumption.  
Several authors analyzed agricultural and non-agricultural assets specifically used to 
generate income. In these cases, the studies analyzed not only the mere asset 
ownership but also the fact that thanks to those assets households starts (or improve) 
new (or existing) micro-enterprise or farm activities. According to Sadoulet et al. 
(2001) and Tirivayi et al. (2016), cash transfers may generate multiplier effects on 
income to the extent that they are used to invest in existing productive activities that 
otherwise would not be improved because of credit constraints. In some case 
beneficiaries, with access to both social protection and other complementary 
packages of agricultural support, are not only more likely to borrow for productive 
purposes and to use improved agricultural technologies, but also to invest in their 
own business activities (Gilligan et al. 2009). 
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Looking at the current literature, the mixed evidence does not seem to be justified by 
the presence of conditionalities or messages associated to the programme: 
conditional cash transfers (in Latin America) show a positive impact in several cases. 
The issue seems to be more related to the amount of money left from current 
consumption that the household can save, therefore it can depend on the transfer size. 
As reported by FAO (2015), different outcomes across programmes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa can be explained by differences in the amount. Also, Haushofer and Shapiro 
(2013) show that beneficiaries who receive a larger transfer tends to have higher 
savings and livestock ownership5.  
Other programme features may affect the productive role of an intervention. The 
duration a beneficiary is exposed to the programme (see Gertler et al. 2012) and the 
presence of complementary interventions (see Blattman et al. 2014) may affect 
households’ investments and in turn long-term living standards. Additionally, 
households’ responses to social transfers may be differently affected by past, current 
or expected future transfers, thus the transfer time profile is an important factor to be 
considered (Bianchi and Bobba 2012; Blattman et al. 2013). Finally, according to some 
research there is heterogeneity in the effect of cash transfers on households’ 
investment choices also according to gender (Covarrubias et al. 2012; Evans et al. 
2014). 
3. The Juntos Programme 
Juntos is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme implemented in 2005 by the 
Government of Peru. The general objectives of the programme are to reduce poverty 
both in the short and long-run respectively through the injection of liquidity to poor 
households (via cash transfers) and the improvement of education and health status 
(through the conditionalities attached to cash transfers) (Perova and Vakis 2009). The 
targeting of Juntos has three steps. First, a geographical targeting selects districts 
according to: exposure to violence; poverty level, measured as a proportion of 
population with unsatisfied basic needs; poverty gap; level of child malnutrition; and 
presence of extreme income poverty (Perova and Vakis 2009). Second, a proxy means 
                                                          
5 Bastagli et al. 2016 claim that most of the studies show increases in households saving and 
investments. However, recently Dasso and Fernandez, 2013 showed that   cash transfers may also 
increase current consumption in “temptation goods”. 
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test (PMT) identifies poor households and is combined with a categorical targeting 
selecting only households with pregnant women or children aged less than 146. Third, 
a community-based targeting helps refining the list produced by the PMT strategy. 
In order to receive the transfer, households are required to comply with specific 
conditionalities such as: at least 85% school attendance during the school year for 
children in school age and regular health check-up for children under 5 and pregnant 
women (Perova and Vakis 2009; Alcázar and Espinoza 2014). According to the official 
data reported by the Juntos Team (2017) in the first two months of 2017, 97.3% of 
targeted households complied with the required conditionalities at least in one of the 
two months.  
The transfer amount is 100 Peruvian Nuevos Soles (around 30 USD) which, in 2009, 
represented 13% of the total monthly household consumption (Perova and Vakis 
2009). The transfer is delivered monthly through bank deposits or with armored van. 
Even though the transfer is addressed to the household, the person entitled to collect 
the benefits are women. It is worth noting that the transfer promotes also some 
accompanying measures, namely beneficiaries’ participation in awareness seminars 
on nutrition, family practices, health, sanitation, literacy, and productive activities.  
The geographical coverage of the programme changed over the years. In 2005 only 4 
departments (out of the 24 departments in Peru) were covered, while in 2017, 21. 
Juntos was first implemented in the poorest areas and then extended to other areas.  
Due to this geographical targeting strategy based on poverty indicators, the first areas 
covered by the programme were the rural ones. The programme was not designed to 
be addressed only to the rural population but, in its initial stage, was concentrated 
mainly in these areas (Trivelli & Díaz 2010).  
According to the official data, until April 2017 the programme covered 749,349 
households in 21 departments (including 1, 304 districts)7. The programme was 
found to have an impact on poverty reduction, utilization of health services, 
                                                          
6 It is worth noting that in 2012 the eligibility criteria slightly changed and define eligible also 
households with children aged less than 19 (Alcázar and Espinoza 2014). 
7 See http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_infojuntos/ 
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improvement of nutritional intake and increase in primary education (Perova and 
Vakis, 2009)8.  
4. Data  
We use Young Lives Data, a longitudinal households survey collected to study 
childhood poverty. The survey constitutes a rich set of information. In order to have 
a sample of comparable households (both poor and better-off), the Young Lives team 
implemented a multi-stage sampling strategy reported in the Young Lives Method 
Guide (2011) and summarised here.  
Firstly, sites predominantly located in poor areas were selected to reflect 
heterogeneity of ethnicity and religion and were over-sampled to ensure households 
comparability. Then within the communities, children and their households were 
randomly selected. The selection of sentinel sites (which correspond to districts) was 
done relying on a national poverty map (developed by FONCODES, the National Fund 
for Development and Social Compensation in 2000) that ranks all districts according 
to a poverty index calculated from variables including infant mortality rates, housing, 
schooling, roads and access to services. The richer 5% of districts were excluded from 
the analysis. The coverage of rural, urban, peri-urban and Amazonian areas was 
ensured. Then, within each selected district, small geographical areas were randomly 
chosen and within them households with one child in the age of interest of the survey 
were randomly selected. Young Lives Database was not intended to be nationally 
representative, but the objective was to ensure analysis of causal relations during long 
periods of time. However, the Peru survey was compared with other surveys showing 
that households poverty rates were similar to the ones of ENAHO 2001 but slightly 
better-off than the ones surveyed by DHS 2000 in terms of access to health and 
prenatal care services (Escobal and Flores, 2008). Therefore, the survey was 
considered representative at the national level. 
Data were collected in 4 rounds: Round 1 was conducted in 2002, when the Juntos 
programme was still not in place, Round 2 in 2006, but still did not contain questions 
about households’ participation in the programme, Round 3 (conducted in 2009) and 
                                                          
8 Perova and Vakis (2009) provided a non-experimental impact evaluation of the Juntos programme 
relying on data from ENAHO, INEI and RENAMU. 
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Round 4 (in 2013) contain questions on the status of beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries. 
In each round 2,766 households were surveyed. There are two types of households in 
the Young Lives questionnaire. Those having a surveyed child aged 1 year old during 
the first round (Younger Cohort) and those having a surveyed child aged 8 years 
during the first round (Older Cohort). Attrition rates are low compared to other 
longitudinal studies, for both the Younger Cohort (6.3%) and the Older Cohort 
(10.3%) (Young Lives, 2014). This database has the advantage to include information 
about on a wide range of productive assets and investments, that other databases (for 
instance, the Enaho Panel) do not include. The questionnaire was meant to follow 
children over time, but unfortunately Older Cohort households in Round 4 were not 
surveyed about all dimensions. For instance, the last round does not contain 
information on land ownership, transfer and remittances received by the household, 
and regularity of payment of the Juntos programme. Moreover, another data 
limitation is that for Round 1 information on consumption is not available.  
5. Empirical Analysis  
The survey contains two variables that allow us to identify programme beneficiaries, 
one asking people if they are currently Juntos beneficiaries and one asking if they 
received Juntos during the last 12 months. We define programme beneficiaries those 
who reported having received transfers for the programme in the last 12 months. We 
find some inconsistency between these two variables. For instance, someone 
answered "I am not a current beneficiary" but then reported to have received the 
transfer in the last 12 months. This is due to the fact that they stopped receiving 
benefits after few months (as clear from the control answers).  
To build a reliable counterfactual, we exclude households who received Juntos in the 
past but are no longer beneficiaries (because these 19 households may still have some 
long run effect of having received Juntos) and we also exclude households who 
reported to be current beneficiaries but did not report having received money in the 
last 12 months (because we are not sure if these 20 households are beneficiaries or 
not)9. 
                                                          
9 We could not crosscheck this information only for the Older Cohort beneficiaries Households of 
Round 4, since they were no longer surveyed about the question related to having received money from 
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Recalling that the programme started in 2005, in Round2 of the survey, conducted in 
2006, there are people benefiting from the programme but, as mentioned above, no 
questions about the participation. To build the beneficiary status for Round 2 we rely 
on retrospective questions asked in Round 3. The number of beneficiaries in Round 2 
is still very small since the programme just started to operate, therefore, we do not 
use Round 2 and we rely on Round 3 to identify beneficiaries.  
Cross-checking information about the localities where the survey took place 
(reported in Escobal and Flores 2008) and the departments where Juntos was 
implemented, we find that the survey includes also districts were the programme 
never operated (namely: Callao, Moquega, Tumbes, ICA). To allow a higher level of 
comparability between treatment and control group we exclude households living in 
areas not targeted by the programme since they are areas with lower levels of 
poverty, food insecurity and crimes. Then, we confine the analysis to households 
living in Sierra (the central area of Peru) because among the households selected to 
be surveyed by Young Lives in 2002, 99% of Juntos beneficiaries live in this area in 
2009 (Round 3). Comparing beneficiaries (mainly located in Sierra) with non-
beneficiaries living in other part of the country could have led to misleading results 
since the two groups may differ for several characteristics.  
Since our study focuses only on one of the three Peruvian regions, we compare the YL 
data, that show a high concentration of beneficiary households in Sierra, with the 
administrative data. A document from the Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social 
(2014) shows that, among the 14 Peruvian departments covered by Juntos in 2009, 
10 were in Sierra (namely, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huancavelica, 
Huanuco, Junin, La Libertad, Pasco, Puno). This amounts to around 83% of the 
beneficiaries living in Sierra districts. Hence, the high concentration of beneficiaries 
found in the YL data seems to be confirmed by the administrative data.   
Due to geographical quota, the programme was not implemented in the same period 
in all eligible districts. To build the counterfactual, we cannot rely on differences in 
quotas during the programme implementation because all the Sierra departments 
                                                          
Juntos during the last 12 months. They were surveyed only about the fact of being “current 
beneficiaries”.  
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were targeted by Juntos before 2009. Therefore, we use an approach similar to 
Andersen et al. (2015), who analysed the Juntos impact on nutrition outcomes relying 
on Young Lives data.  
As mentioned above, in Round 1 (2002) the programme was not operating, hence we 
have all the pre-programme households’ characteristics that allow us to analyse the 
difference before and after the treatment for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  
The main issue to develop an impact evaluation in absence of treatment 
randomization, is to identify and remove the selection bias through quasi-experiment 
techniques. Since the programme participation is not random, it is possible that 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are different not only in their status but also in 
other observable and unobservable dimensions that determine their eligibility and 
affect the outcome variables. If beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are different, not 
only in the programme participation but also in other dimensions, then we cannot 
disentangle the effect of the programme from one of these dimensions on the 
observed outcomes of interest. In this case the estimator can be biased and lead to 
misleading results. 
In order to remove the selection-bias, we rely on a two steps procedure. First, we 
identify a control group calculating the propensity score (based on pre-programme 
observable characteristics) and we select for the analysis only observations in the 
common support. Second, we implement a difference-in-difference technique (only 
on the common support sample selected through the propensity score) to remove the 
selection bias due to unobserved and time invariant characteristics specific of the 
treatment and the control group.  
a. Descriptive Statistics 
After excluding some observations, following the criteria explained above, at baseline 
(Round 1, in 2002) we have 1,173 households for which we have information about 
their status in Round 3. Among them, 429 will become beneficiaries in Round 3 and 
744 will not. Table 1 shows households characteristics at baseline. Beneficiaries are 
more concentrated in rural areas, they have lower wealth index (built relying on 
housing quality index, access to service index and consumer durable index) with 
respect to future non-beneficiaries.  
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Table 1: Beneficiaries and Non-beneficiaries at Baseline 
  Non-Beneficiaries Beneficiaries   
  N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max Diff P-value 
Community Characteristics 
Rural Area=1 744 0.265 0 1 429 0.804 0 1 -0.539 0.000 
Households reporting crime 
in the community 
744 0.081 0 0.217 429 0.076 0 0.189 0.005 0.080 
Stunting children in the 
community 
744 0.304 0 0.75 429 0.486 0 0.806 -0.183 0.000 
Household composition  
Household size 744 5.618 2 16 429 6.14 2 18 -0.522 0.000 
Presence of children under 
7 in the household=1 
744 0.941 0 1 429 0.986 0 1 -0.045 0.000 
Household Head Age 744 36.827 17 83 416 35.608 16 73 1.218 0.089 
Househol Head Sex 744 0.862 0 1 429 0.886 0 1 -0.024 0.235 
Caregiver is literate=1 744 0.774 0 1 429 0.289 0 1 0.485 0.000 
Household Etnicity  
White 744 0.043 0 1 429 0.023 0 1 0.020 0.080 
Mestizo 744 0.956 0 1 429 0.977 0 1 -0.021 0.065 
Household First Language  
Spanish 732 0.914 0 1 423 0.404 0 1 0.510 0.000 
Quechua 732 0.074 0 1 423 0.546 0 1 -0.472 0.000 
Other  732 0.012 0 1 423 0.05 0 1 -0.037 0.000 
Household Economic Status 
Housing Quality Index 743 0.417 0.006 1 428 0.241 0 0.785 0.177 0.000 
Access to Service Index 743 0.663 0 1 428 0.305 0 1 0.358 0.000 
Consumer Durables Index 744 0.29 0 0.917 429 0.108 0 0.75 0.182 0.000 
Ownership of livestock  744 0.684 0 1 429 0.97 0 1 -0.286 0.000 
Ownership of production 
animals 
744 0.68 0 1 429 0.97 0 1 -0.290 0.000 
Number of owned 
production animals  
744 13.325 0 311 429 24.014 0 298 -10.689 0.000 
Ownership of draft animals 744 0.257 0 1 429 0.524 0 1 -0.268 0.000 
Number of owned draft 
animals 
744 0.794 0 15 429 1.131 0 13 -0.336 0.002 
Agricultural assets 
ownership 
744 0.591 0 1 429 0.963 0 1 -0.371 0.000 
Non-Agricultural assets 
ownership 
744 0.675 0 1 429 0.235 0 1 0.439 0.000 
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Future beneficiaries own more livestock and agricultural assets but less non-
agricultural assets. This may be explained by the fact that better-off households are 
likely to be less engaged in farm or pastoral activities and more involved in micro-
enterprise activities. Indeed, the correlation between the wealth index and the 
ownership of non-agricultural assets is positive while that between the wealth index 
and the ownership of agricultural assets and livestock is negative. Only 29% of future 
beneficiary households have a children caregiver who is literate against the 77% of 
non-beneficiaries.  
Moreover, 91% of non-beneficiaries speak Spanish against 40% of beneficiaries who 
speak other languages. Future beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries at baseline are 
significantly different in most of the community and households’ characteristics. 
b. Methods  
Since the programme eligibility was based on observable characteristics, we rely on 
them to identify a counterfactual for treated households. We implement a Propensity 
Score Matching, calculating the probability of being beneficiary through a logit model. 
In particular, we compute the probability of being eligible in Round 3 given the pre-
programme households characteristics in Round 110. To calculate the Propensity 
Score, we included the programme targeting criteria and some other households’ 
demographic and educational characteristics. As reported in Section 3, the targeting 
strategy of Juntos includes geographical targeting, categorical targeting, proxy-means 
test and community-based targeting. More specifically, for the geographical targeting, 
and in line with the targeting of the programme, we calculate and include in the 
propensity score the percentage of crime and stunting children registered in each 
community. To account for the categorical component of the targeting strategy, we 
                                                          
10 One issue of implementing the Propensity Score Matching consists in the fact that we use the 
characteristics of households in 2002. People who were identified by the survey as beneficiaries in 
Round 3, were selected by the programme in different points in time starting from 2005. However, it 
is possible that, between 2002 and the date households started to be beneficiaries, some of the baseline 
observable characteristics included in the Propensity Score Matching followed different trends for 
different households, differently affecting households’ eligibility for the programme. One solution 
could be to rely on characteristics of Round 2 (collected in 2006) but we cannot do it because the 
programme was announced and implemented in 2005, therefore, it is possible that some households 
characteristic in 2006 (for example, housing quality index or consumer durables index) was already 
affected by the programme implementation (for households selected by the programme) or by some 
anticipation effects (for example, the household demographic composition for households who wanted 
to apply for the programme). 
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include a dummy equal to one when, within the household, there was at least one child 
aged under 7 in 2002, so that in 2009 the household could be still eligible for the 
programme having at least one child aged less than 14. We also rely on proxies of the 
household poverty level such as the wealth index (which includes the housing quality 
index, consumer durables index and access to services) and we include the household 
size and the educational level of children caregiver within the household. The final 
step of targeting is community-based and is not driven by formal rules, hence the only 
thing we cannot control are the criteria implemented by each community to validate 
the list of potential beneficiaries. The Propensity Score Matching allows us to identify 
a common support for beneficiary households (Figure 1) and to exclude households 
who show very different characteristics with respect to those eligible for the 
programme11.   
Figure 1: Common Support after Propensity Score Matching  
 
In particular, we exclude around 20.8% of non-beneficiaries, and 0.5% of beneficiary, 
who are out from the common support. After these operations, we end up with a 
sample of 1,016 households, 427 beneficiaries and 589 non-beneficiaries. We 
compute the standardized mean difference12 to check whether the two groups are 
                                                          
11 Propensity Score Estimates are showed in Appendix 1.1  
12 Instead of relying on a simple t-test, which is size sensitive, we used the standardized mean 
difference (that is the mean difference across groups on the pooled standard deviation). 
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similar in observable characteristics used to define eligibility.  In Table 2, we show 
how beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are not significantly different in the 
observable eligibility criteria. 
As reported by Khandker et al. 2009, propensity score matching alone cannot take 
into account unobserved characteristics (that might determine the treatment).  
Therefore, after the selection of a reliable counterfactual, we implement also a 
difference-in-difference, between Round 3 and Round 1, only on the sample of 
households in the common support (see Khandker et al. 2009). This methodology 
allows us to remove time-invariant unobserved differences between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. We estimate the difference in outcomes between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries after and before the treatment. If the two groups are the same on 
average in both observable and unobservable time invariant characteristics, except 
that one is treated and the other is not, then we can ascribe the differences in 
outcomes to the impact of the treatment. 
Table 2: Comparison between groups after the Propensity Score Matching 
 
Mean in 
Treated 
Mean in 
Untreated 
P-value for 
difference 
Rural area=1 0.810 0.820 0.630 
Percentage of households reporting crime in the 
community 
0.080 0.080 0.540 
Percentage of households reporting stunting 
children in the community 
0.490 0.480 0.654 
Presence of children under 7 in the household=1 0.990 0.990 0.921 
Wealth Index 0.22 0.21 0.550 
Household size 0.810 0.820 0.630 
Caregiver is literate=1 0.080 0.080 0.540 
 
Our dependant variables of interest are: (i) household ownership of any livestock; (ii) 
household ownership of production animals including both ruminant animals (such 
as sheep, goats, pigs, poultry, rabbits) and milk animals (traditional and modern 
cows); (iii) number of owned production animals; (iv) household ownership of draft 
                                                          
 
 
 
22 
 
animals (including: donkey, horses, mules and oxen) (v) number of owned draft 
animals; (vi) household ownership of agricultural assets (for instance: shovel, rakes, 
cart/wheelbarrow, motorised saw, animal drawn plough, storehouse/granary, silos 
and harvester tractor); (vii) household ownership of non-agricultural assets (namely: 
construction tools, food preparation equipment, transport equipment, weaving 
equipment and computer).  
It is worth noting that questions related to agricultural and non-agricultural assets 
specifically ask if these assets were used for income-generating activities. Therefore, 
we can interpret these variables as the fact that the household is involved in income-
generating micro-enterprise or farm activities.   
Firstly, we estimate the following model with no covariates:  
∆𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝑻𝒊 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕                  (1) 
Where, 𝛼 is a constant term, 𝛽 is the true effect of treatment (the difference in 
difference estimator) and u is the error term. 
Then we control for a vector of covariate X, including: type site (rural or urban); 
wealth index; other unpredictable transfers received by the household (namely: 
transfers from religious organizations; transfers from charity groups; donations; 
other transfers); shocks that affected the households in last 12 months 
(environmental shocks; crime shocks; economic shocks; family shocks); and 
household size. 
∆𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝑻𝒊 + 𝜽∆𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕       (2) 
In Round 4 for the older cohort households, we do not have information about: other 
kind of transfers received by the households (therefore we cannot control for them); 
about the Juntos payment frequency; and we cannot cross-check information on 
household’s programme participation. For this reason, we use Round 4 just for the 
robustness check and to analyse whether the effect of the programme is sustained 
over time for households that were beneficiaries in both rounds.   
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6. Results 
We investigate whether the conditional cash transfer programme Juntos has an 
impact on the productive investment decision of beneficiaries. In Table 3 we present 
the results of Model 1, showing the difference-in-difference estimator.  
Table 3: Impact on Productive Assets and Activities 
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Juntos -0.006 0.044 0.071* -0.012 0.097** 0.140*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0331) (1.628) (0.129) (0.0246) (0.0353) 
N 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 910 910 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 4: Impact on Productive Assets and Activities- With Covariates 
 Livestock
=1 
Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals 
=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultura
l Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Juntos -0.018 0.023 0.049 -0.001 0.086* 0.119*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0281) (0.0357) (1.783) (0.139) (0.0265) (0.0374) 
        
Rural Area=1 0.061 0.047 0.119*** 0.081* 0.107** 0.071* -0.019 
 (0.0470) (0.0505) (0.0642) (3.200) (0.250) (0.0491) (0.0693) 
        
Wealth Index -0.093** -0.092** -0.021 0.008 0.035 -0.070* 0.133*** 
 (0.0965) (0.104) (0.132) (6.566) (0.513) (0.104) (0.146) 
        
Other 
Trasfers=1 
0.017 
(0.0195) 
0.012 
(0.0209) 
0.084** 
(0.0266) 
0.018 
(1.328) 
0.120*** 
(0.104) 
-0.020 
(0.0201) 
0.082* 
(0.0284) 
 
Environmenta
l Shocks 
0.027 
(0.0248) 
0.050 
(0.0267) 
0.047 
(0.0339) 
-0.062 
(1.690) 
0.007 
(0.132) 
0.057 
(0.0250) 
0.046 
(0.0353) 
 
Crime Shocks 0.028 0.041 -0.007 0.015 0.027 -0.016 -0.029 
 (0.0349) (0.0374) (0.0476) (2.373) (0.185) (0.0360) (0.0508) 
        
Economic 
Shocks 
-0.008 
(0.0239) 
-0.000 
(0.0257) 
0.012 
(0.0326) 
0.019 
(1.628) 
0.001 
(0.127) 
0.044 
(0.0243) 
0.052 
(0.0343) 
 
Family 
Shocks 
-0.040 -0.037 0.015 -0.039 0.050 -0.049 -0.014 
 (0.0208) (0.0224) (0.0284) (1.418) (0.111) (0.0216) (0.0305) 
        
Male Headed 
Household=1 
0.037 
(0.0357) 
0.059 
(0.0383) 
-0.006 
(0.0487) 
0.015 
(2.431) 
-0.000 
(0.190) 
0.026 
(0.0392) 
0.007 
(0.0553) 
 
        
Household 
Size 
0.081* 
(0.00594) 
0.066* 
(0.00638) 
0.073* 
(0.00811) 
0.109*** 
(0.404) 
0.099** 
(0.0316) 
0.074* 
(0.00635 
0.037 
(0.00896) 
 
N 986 986 986 986 986 881 881 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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While Table 4 shows the results for Model 2 when we control for other covariates 
(that can be interpreted as changes between Round 3 and Round 1).  
Moreover, beneficiaries are also significantly more likely to invest in agricultural 
assets used for income generating farm activities and to invest in non-agricultural 
assets used for micro-enterprise activities.  
The specification with covariates (Table 4) confirms all the results of Table 3 except 
for the coefficient related to the ownership of draft animals which is no longer 
significant. 
The impact of Juntos on investments in number of draft animals, is still positive and 
significant at 5% while coefficients related to agricultural and non-agricultural assets 
are still significant at 0.1%. Our results confirm the existing evidence about the fact 
that an injection of liquidity may allow households to invest in productive assets and 
engage in income-generating activities13.We are also interested to find out whether 
the conditional cash transfer is more likely to relax liquidity constraints or to be used 
as an insurance for risky investments thanks to the fact that the transfer (by design) 
is regular and predictable. Bianchi and Bobba (2012) studied these mechanisms 
analysing the impact of Progresa on occupational choices in Mexico. However, there 
are no studies that test this mechanism for investment in productive assets and 
activities. Ideally, we could test this hypothesis relying on the fact that households 
with only children aged 14 (which until 2012 was the age threshold to receive the 
transfer) will not be eligible in the future and check whether these households 
changed investment decision due to the lack of an insurance for the future. Unluckily, 
in Round 3, 94.4% of households have at least one child aged under 10. Therefore, the 
sample of households that will have to leave the programme soon (households with 
children aged between 10 and 14 years) is too small to test our hypothesis. However, 
the high percentage of households with children aged under 10 means that, ceteris 
paribus, most households of our sample know that they could still be eligible for the 
transfer at least for other 4 years, until all children turn 14. 
                                                          
13 These results are coherent with the findings of Del Pozo and Guzmán (2011), who studied 
investment in livestock for Juntos beneficiaries. However, in their study is not specified whether 
beneficiaries use these livestock for income generating activities. 
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 Given these data limitations, we cannot directly test the aforementioned hypothesis 
and, in the attempt to find a solution, we build an indicator of ‘other transfers’, for 
which we control for. The indicator is a dummy variable taking value one when the 
household receives at least one unpredictable transfer, defined as transfers that 
consist in lump sum given without predictability and frequency (such as transfers 
from religious organizations, from charity groups, donations, and other non-specified 
transfers different from predictable transfers; therefore we excluded predictable 
transfers, such as pensions and social security). Looking at the coefficient related to 
other unpredictable transfers we can observe that its impact on dependent variables 
related to draft animals and non-agricultural assets is positive and significant. Our 
findings suggest that predictability of payment does not play a central role in the case 
of Juntos, since also unpredictable transfers have an effect on investments. Therefore, 
it is possible that the main role of Juntos is to relax liquidity constraints rather to work 
as an insurance for risky investments.  
To further check this hypothesis, we build different conditional samples first 
comparing beneficiaries that receive the transfer regularly with non-beneficiaries and 
then comparing beneficiaries that do not receive the transfer regularly with non-
beneficiaries. According to Barrientos (2012), social transfers may reduce insecurity, 
and consequently the inefficient use of resources, when they are “regular and 
reliable”. If the “insurance channel” would be verified, we can expect that households 
that receive the transfer regularly (every month, as by programme design) look at the 
transfer as a predictable and regular source of income and invest more in productive 
assets with respect to people who did not receive the transfer regularly (they did not 
receive the transfer every month in the last year).   
Coefficients are higher and more significant for beneficiaries that receive the transfer 
regularly, however, looking at the p-value for the difference between coefficients we 
can conclude that the two groups (beneficiaries who received the transfer regularly 
and who did not) are not significantly different (Table 5). Transfer regularity does not 
play a significant role in improving investment in productive assets. This finding 
reinforces the hypothesis that Juntos acts on investment mainly by relaxing liquidity 
constraints and it is not perceived by beneficiaries as a source of insurance.  
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Table 5: Transfer Regularity 
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets - Beneficiaries who did receive the transfers regularly 
Juntos -0.023 0.007 0.048 -0.007 0.080* 0.103** 0.132*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0353) (0.0405) (2.081) (0.169) (0.0324) (0.0442) 
N 811 811 811 811 811 709 709 
 
Impact on Productive Assets - Beneficiaries who did not receive the transfers regularly 
Juntos -0.000 0.037 0.034 0.019 0.075 0.087* 0.120** 
 (0.0383) (0.0406) (0.0437) (2.145) (0.178) (0.0392) (0.0522) 
N 744 744 744 744 744 645 645 
P-value for 
difference 
0.4151 0.2469 0.8258 0.6358 0.9076 0.9152 0.9632 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Another purpose of our analysis is to check whether the programme features, such as 
length of programme exposure, may affect investment decisions. Our results (see 
Table 6) suggest that beneficiaries that receive the transfer for less than two years are 
still significantly more likely to invest in agricultural assets and non-agricultural 
assets with respect to non-beneficiaries but only beneficiaries who receive the 
transfer for more than two years are also more likely to invest in draft animals with 
respect to non-beneficiaries. 
Table 6: Programme Duration - With Covariates 
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets - Beneficiaries who receive the transfers for less than 2 years 
Juntos -0.036 -0.015 -0.017 -0.032 0.045 0.107** 0.114** 
 (0.0370) (0.0398) (0.0427) (2.003) (0.176) (0.0384) (0.0503) 
N 742 742 742 742 742 639 639 
Impact on Productive Assets - Beneficiaries who receive the transfers for more than 2 years 
Juntos 0.005 0.049 0.083* 0.023 0.095* 0.086* 0.140*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0357) (0.0413) (2.186) (0.171) (0.0328) (0.0455) 
N 818 818 818 818 818 720 720 
P-value for 
difference 
0.0983 0.0275 0.0767 0.2981 0.2616 0.2379 0.7296 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Coefficients for the two groups are not significantly different. We can conclude that 
the programme features do not significantly affect outcomes differently across 
beneficiaries. Finally, we divide the sample according to the wealth index (hereafter 
WI) at the baseline (Round 1). Comparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with a 
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WI level below the median we do not find significant programme effect. Conversely, 
for households with a WI higher than the median, we do find that the programme 
impact for beneficiaries is positive and significant for both agricultural and non-
agricultural assets used for income generating activities. The numerical coefficients 
of the two sub-samples are not significantly different, however Table 7 suggests that 
the programme produces a stronger impact for better-off beneficiaries. This finding 
is consistent with the hypothesis that wealthier people tend to pursue an asset 
accumulation strategy while poor agents tend to accumulate low-return buffer assets 
threshold (see Zimmerman and Carter 2003) and, therefore, that social protection 
policies may affect agents investments behaviours differently depending on the fact 
that they are above or below a poverty threshold. In our case, it seems that the CCT is 
able to positively and significantly affect beneficiaries who are relatively better-off in 
terms of wealth, while it is not able to do the same for beneficiaries who are far from 
a certain WI threshold. In sum, the programme seems to have an impact on the poor 
but not on the poorest of the poor14. 
Table 7: Impact on beneficiaries with different levels of Wealth Index- With 
Covariates 
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets - WI Below the median 
Juntos 0.034 0.060 0.016 0.060 0.052 0.048 0.026 
 (0.0230) (0.0276) (0.0571) (2.327) (0.218) (0.0224) (0.0433) 
N 493 493 493 493 493 474 474 
 
Impact on Productive Assets - WI Above the median 
Juntos -0.073 -0.041 0.040 -0.083 0.055 0.108* 0.108* 
 (0.0560) (0.0580) (0.0490) (3.172) (0.197) (0.0588) (0.0701) 
N 493 493 493 493 493 407 407 
P-value for 
difference 
0.0236 0.0924 0.8118 0.0993 0.9239 0.0694 0.1435 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
7. Robustness Check 
As mentioned above, we use Round 3 for our analysis, since we do not have all the 
information for Round 4. In particular, in Round 4 we do not have information about 
                                                          
14 It could be interesting also to look only at the programme impact on households who did not own 
assets at baseline but unfortunately the sample is too small to conduct an analysis on this conditional 
sample. 
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the payment frequency and about the other transfers received by the Older Cohort 
households, so we cannot control for these variables. Therefore, we use Round 4 only 
for a robustness check. First, we calculate the Difference in Difference estimator 
without covariates relying on Round 1 and Round 4. We analyse only households in 
the common support and people who are beneficiaries in both Round 3 and Round 4, 
that are 301 individuals (see Table 8).   
Table 8: Beneficiary status in Round 3 and Round 4 
  
Round 4 
 
  
Untreated Treated Missing Total 
Round3 
Untreated 297 100 192 589 
Treated 24 301 102 427 
 
Total 321 401 294 1,016 
We find a positive and significant impact of the programme on all the dependent 
variables that were found to be significant relying on Round 3 (see Table 3) except for 
the draft animal ownership, which coefficient was found to be significant for Round 3 
but not for Round 4 (see Table 9). 
Table 9: Robustness Check: Using data from Round 4  
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets-Without Covariates 
Juntos 0.351*** 0.464*** 0.040 0.131** 0.133** 0.250*** 0.115* 
 (0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0540) (2.194) (0.206) (0.0361) (0.0552) 
N 512 553 553 553 512 433 433 
 
Impact on Productive Assets- With covariates 
Juntos 0.190*** 0.242*** 0.057 -0.009 0.072 0.139** 0.120* 
 (0.0373) (0.0381) (0.0605) (2.570) (0.235) (0.0376) (0.0598) 
N 504 504 504 504 504 433 433 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Additionally, for households that are beneficiaries in both Round 3 and Round 4, the 
programme has a positive and significant impact also on livestock ownership and on 
production animals ownership. Controlling for the same covariates used in the rest of 
the analysis (except for other transfers received by the household) results are 
partially confirmed. With respect to Round 3, the programme impact is still positive 
and significant at 0.1% for agricultural assets. However, the coefficient related to non-
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agricultural assets loses significance shifting from 0.1% to 5%. Also controlling for 
covariates, beneficiary households are significantly more likely to invest in livestock 
and in production animals with respect to non-beneficiaries while the coefficient 
related to the number of draft animals is no longer significant in Round 4. While 
initially (in Round 3) beneficiary households invest in draft animals, agricultural and 
non-agricultural assets, then they start to invest also in other kind of livestock, 
particularly in production animals. The fact that households start to invest also in 
production animals is consistent with the idea that households tend to combine 
different assets to achieve the preferred risk-return combination (Zimmerman and 
Carter 2003). Moreover, after a certain threshold of the same kind of accumulated 
assets, the returns may start to be decreasing and therefore investing in other assets 
may be more convenient.  A problem for our analysis is that to build the counterfactual 
we could not rely on differences in quota determined by the geographical roll-out of 
the programme, since all the Sierra departments were targeted before 2009. 
However, in Round 4 there are 100 new beneficiaries in Sierra (see Table 8). We then 
conduct a robustness check comparing beneficiaries of Round 3 with these 100 
people who are not beneficiaries in Round 3 but become beneficiaries in Round 4. 
Table 10 suggests that only the coefficient related to the number of owned draft 
animals is still significant, other coefficients maintain the same sign, but they lose 
significance. However, we should be cautious in interpreting the results since, in this 
case, the sample is small (100 non-beneficiaries). 
Table 10:  Robustness Check: Including 100 new beneficiaries  
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets- Without Covariates 
Juntos -0.030 -0.017 0.065 0.077 0.087* 0.012 0.039 
 (0.0261) (0.0303) (0.0670) (3.354) (0.232) (0.0263) (0.0543) 
N 527 527 527 527 527 511 511 
 
Impact on Productive Assets- With Covariates 
Juntos -0.031 -0.017 0.051 0.069 0.060 0.014 0.046 
 (0.0272) (0.0314) (0.0690) (3.489) (0.236) (0.0272) (0.0551) 
N 516 516 516 516 516 501 501 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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8. Conclusion 
The paper provides an impact evaluation of the Juntos programme on households’ 
decisions to invest in livestock, and agricultural and non-agricultural assets used for 
income generating activities. The idea is that cash transfer on the one hand can relax 
households’ liquidity constraints and, on the other hand, when regular and 
predictable, can work as an insurance mechanism, therefore allowing households to 
invest in risky but higher-return activities. The reason why households should invest 
the saved amount in productive assets and activities is linked to the fact that the cash 
transfer programmes have usually a limited duration, and the investment in 
productive assets and activities is one of the channels through which beneficiaries can 
maintain the living standards reached thanks to the programme also after its 
termination. Moreover, assets accumulation represents an insurance for consumption 
in case of bad economic conditions.  
To assess the programme impact, we rely on Propensity Score Matching and 
Difference in Difference. We show that beneficiaries households are significantly 
more likely to invest in agricultural and non-agricultural assets used for income 
generating activities and draft animals. Comparing the programme impact with the 
effect of other unpredictable transfer received by the households, we argue that it 
seems to be more likely for Juntos to help relaxing liquidity constraints rather than 
working as an insurance for risky investments. This result is confirmed by the fact 
that transfers regularity does not produce significant differences between groups of 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Moreover, we analyse another programme 
feature, we show that the programme duration does not produce significant 
differences between groups of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. We also show that 
the programme has a productive role for the poor but not for the poorest of the poor. 
We check the robustness of our results using outcomes from another survey round 
and we find that results are robust and that the programme shows a sustained impact 
over time.  
This paper shows that, beyond the mere protection, the Juntos programme has also a 
production role, positively affecting beneficiaries’ decisions to invest in productive 
assets and activities. Hence, cash transfer programmes may affect poverty not only in 
the short-term during the programme implementation but also in the long-term, 
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through investments in assets and activities that may support poor households also 
after the programme termination.  
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Appendix 1.1 
Table 1.1: Propensity Score Estimates 
  
 Juntos  
(Beneficiary=1 in Round 3) 
Area of residence (rural=1) 0.502* 
 (0.199) 
  
Percentage of households reporting crimes in the community  -0.715*** 
 (1.780) 
  
Percentage of stunted children in the community 1.661*** 
 (0.621) 
  
Presence of children under 14 in the  
household in Round 3 (under 7 at the baseline) 
0.511* 
(0.527) 
  
  
Wealth index -2.295*** 
 (0.650) 
  
Household size 0.153 
 (0.0377) 
  
Caregiver is literate=1 -0.849*** 
 (0.174) 
N 1,169 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Appendix 1.2 
We check the programme impact on two subsamples of people living in rural or in 
urban areas. We find that in both rural and urban areas the programme positively and 
significantly affects beneficiaries investments in non-agricultural assets used for 
income generating activities. Conversely, as expected, only in rural areas programme 
beneficiaries are more likely to invest in livestock while in urban areas the opposite 
happens. One interesting result is that only in urban areas the impact of the 
programme on agricultural assets is positive and significant, while in rural areas is 
positive but not significant. This result can be explained by the fact that in our sample 
(in Round 3), around 37% of urban households own land for agricultural purposes.    
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Table 1.2 Impact on Rural and Urban Areas 
 Livestock=1 Production 
Animals=1 
Draft 
Animals=1 
Number of 
Production 
Animals 
Number 
of Draft 
Animals 
Agricultural 
Assets=1 
Non-
agricultural 
Assets=1 
Impact on Productive Assets - People who live in rural area 
Juntos 0.026 0.070 0.017 0.120** 0.129** 0.033 0.095* 
 (0.0157) (0.0206) (0.0560) (2.632) (0.212) (0.0207) (0.0442) 
N 501 501 501 501 501 491 491 
Impact on Productive Assets - People who live in urban areas 
Juntos -0.038 -0.005 -0.051 -0.200*** -0.104* 0.137** 0.145** 
 (0.0569) (0.0596) (0.0477) (2.534) (0.195) (0.0576) (0.0703) 
N 515 515 515 515 515 419 419 
P-value for 
difference 
0.2178 0.4504 0.3674 0.0003 0.0010 0.0029 0.1486 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Chapter 2 
Making Migration a Choice:  
the Impact of Cash Transfers on Internal Migration in Peru 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses whether welfare interventions, such as conditional cash transfer 
programmes, may affect households’ internal migration from rural to urban areas. 
Using Propensity Score Matching, we analyse the impact of the Juntos programme in 
Peru and find that beneficiary households are significantly less likely to migrate from 
rural to urban areas with respect to similar non-beneficiaries because receiving a cash 
transfer increases the opportunity cost to migrate. To confirm this hypothesis, we also 
show that Juntos does not crowd-out private transfers allowing an increase in the 
opportunity cost of moving. Results are robust confining the analysis to the Sierra 
region, where the majority of the programme beneficiaries live. We find a sustained 
impact of the programme over time.  
 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfers; Impact Evaluation; Migration; Peru; Juntos. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing literature on migration focused on several drivers of international and 
internal migration, among others: differences in origin and destination labour 
markets, income differential, distance, presence of social networks in destination 
countries, skills transferability, political stability and conflicts. The objective of this 
paper is to study whether welfare interventions may be also considered relevant 
determinants of migration.  
The idea that welfare may influence migrations choices was firstly introduced by 
Borjas who, in 1999, developed the welfare magnet hypothesis. His theoretical model 
focuses on international migration and it is based on the hypothesis that migrants are 
attracted by countries that offer better welfare systems. In its seminal work, Borjas 
showed that migrants arrived in the U.S. were more attracted by states with higher 
levels of welfare and that immigrants who are potential welfare recipients were more 
clustered in states with higher levels of cash transfers benefits.  
In developing countries, welfare policies targeted at specific vulnerable or poor 
groups are often referred to as social protection policies. In what follows we use the 
terms “welfare” and “social protection” interchangeably.  
The existing literature defined “welfare migration” often from the perspective of the 
receiving countries considering welfare benefits as one of the factors that migrants 
may take into account in their decision about the destination country. However, as 
pointed out by Lee (1966), migration should be studied jointly considering pull and 
push factors but also intervening obstacles which may favour or discourage migration 
for certain population groups given economic, geographical and political conditions. 
Therefore, to have a comprehensive overview of the phenomena, “welfare migration” 
could be studied and analysed also from the perspective of the origin community or 
country. If people migrate toward countries (or regions) with high welfare benefits 
levels, it could be the case that the lack of welfare in source countries (or regions) is 
also one of the causes that lead them to migrate.  
Our objective, therefore, is to test if welfare interventions may affect the decision to 
migrate, not from the usual perspective of the place of destination (i.e. attracting 
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migrants) but from the perspective of the place of origin in the case of internal 
migration.  
Although the current debate on migration focuses mostly on international migration, 
in 2013 at the global level there were approximately 763 million of internal 
migrants15 (Bell and Charles‐Edwards 2013) against 232 million of international 
migrants (UN 2013). Internal migration from rural to urban areas was firstly 
explained by Harris and Todaro in 1970, who developed a theoretical model showing 
that the decision to migrate is based on expected income differential between rural 
and urban areas. Indeed, individuals migrate if the expected income in the destination 
country or community, net of the cost to migrate, is higher than the income in origin 
country or community. In 1980, Todaro developed a framework describing the 
economic and non-economic determinants of migration. Among the costs of 
migration, Todaro mentioned transport cost, cost of living and opportunity cost. The 
opportunity cost of moving can be described as the “income a migrant could have 
earned if he did not move” (Levy and Wadycki,1974).  
Cash transfers may increase the opportunity cost of moving by providing to the 
household an additional source of income in the place of origin. In our paper, we want 
to analyse whether the presence of welfare interventions may affect the households’ 
decision to migrate from rural to urban areas. In particular, we show that social 
transfers discourage migration by increasing the opportunity cost of moving. This 
research aims at contributing to the existing literature, which so far has had mixed 
results, through a new case study analysing the relationship between Juntos, a 
Peruvian social protection programme, and internal migration flows in Peru. To check 
the robustness of our results, we check whether Juntos may crowd-out private 
transfers. If this is the case, the opportunity-cost to migrate remains the same of the 
one registered before the start of the programme, because the increase in income due 
to cash transfers is offset by the loss of private transfers. In this case we could expect 
that the programme does not produce any impact on migration. Conversely, if cash 
transfers do not crowd-out private transfers the opposite happens: there is a real 
                                                          
15 Defined as those who live in a region different from the one of birth 
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increase in the opportunity cost of moving and, in this case, we can expect that cash 
transfers may deter migration.  
Additionally, to confirm the opportunity-cost mechanism, to the extent allowed by the 
data, we analyse whether the presence of conditionalities attached to the transfer may 
have a role in affecting migration. Conditionalities require children and caregiver to 
stay in the place of origin to attend school and health check-up. This affects their 
migration decision and may constitute a reason to avert migration. However, the 
other working age members are not affected by conditionalities. To disentangle the 
possible effect of conditionalities on migration choices we conduct the analysis for 
both the households and for single households’ members.   
We choose to analyse Peru as a case study because there was an impressive migration 
from rural to urban areas and this trend is likely to continue in the future (see Figure 
1). The internal Peruvian migration to urban areas (and in particular to Lima) caused 
the creation of the so called “pueblos jovenes”, shanty towns where there are poor 
housing and services conditions. 
Figure 1: Rural Urban Migration in Peru 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division (2014): World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. 
(1)Proportions of urban and rural population in the current country or area in per cent of the total 
population, 1950 to 2050. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature about the 
relations between welfare and migration; Section 3 describes the Juntos programme 
in Peru; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and 
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shows the descriptive statistics, the identification strategy and the methods; Section 
6 shows the results; Section 7 presents robustness checks; Section 8 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
Let us briefly analyse in turn the two streams of literature about social protection as 
“pull” and “push” factor and the literature about crowding-out effect between public 
and private transfers. 
a. Social Protection as “Pull Factor” 
Since its postulation, the welfare magnet hypothesis, developed by Borjas, was tested 
by several scholars with very different methods, assumptions and results and was 
mainly studied for international migration flows. The theory was confirmed by some 
research (among others: De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2006;  Warin and Svaton 2008) and 
was able to explain migration inflows under certain specific conditions and for certain 
groups: for unskilled workers but not for the skilled ones (Brucker et al. 2002; Meyer 
2000);  for unskilled migrants in case of free-migration regimes but not in case of 
restricted-migration regimes (Razin and Wahba 2015); for groups who are more 
likely to be eligible for welfare programmes, such as women and mothers 
(Enchautegui 1997; Meyer 2000); for groups who are eligible for specific programmes 
in certain country states (Southwick 1981).  However, the welfare magnet hypothesis 
was also rejected by a number of studies (Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Menz 2008; 
Giulietti et al. 2013; Giulietti 2014) that found that migration seems to be much more 
driven by other factors, such as social networks rather than by the level of welfare 
benefits (De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2009). 
The mixed evidence about this issue may be explained by the following reasons: many 
studies do not account for the possible reversal causality between migration and 
welfare spending (Giulietti and Wahba 2012); several studies lack of a clear 
differentiation across forced migrants and labour migrants (Schulzek 2012); often 
studies underestimate the linkages between the factors that lead of different groups 
to migrate and the choice of the destination country.      
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b. Social Protection as “Push Factor” 
The literature about how social protection affects the probability to migrate is still 
very limited, mixed and mainly based on empirical evidence rather than theoretical 
models.  
As summarized by Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2012), social protection 
programmes may produce two different effects: on the one hand, they may deter 
migration by providing additional sources of income to potential migrants or by 
increasing the opportunity cost to migrate since potential migrants do not want to 
lose the benefit they obtained; on the other hand, the additional income received may 
be saved and used to migrate for poor households that otherwise would have not 
enough money to cover the migrations costs.  
Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2012) reviewed 22 studies of social protection 
programmes (unconditional and conditional cash transfers, public works 
programmes, health insurance, unemployment insurance, health fee waivers, school 
subsidies and asset transfers) and economic labour migration. They found evidence 
in favour of both hypotheses. Social programmes increased the beneficiaries’ 
probability to migrate when the transfer amount was not enough generous to satisfy 
the households’ needs in the place of origin and, therefore, the transfer was used to 
fund migration. Instead, social programmes were able to reduce the beneficiaries’ 
probability to migrate when the benefits amount was generous enough to allow 
households to have an adequate standard of living in their own country.  
Deshingkar et al. (2015), through a qualitative study conducted in Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Kenya and Malawi, tested the hypothesis that cash transfers may directly create the 
conditions to reduce the need to migrate or instead be used to fund the cost of 
migration. What they found is that social protection benefits do not seem to have a 
direct impact on migration but, in some cases, cash transfers allow children to be 
enrolled at school and to achieve a higher level of education enabling them to access 
jobs and, in turn, to fund the migration costs when they are older.  
Thus, there is no clear evidence about the impact of social protection on migration. 
This depends on whether social transfer crowd-out private transfers (see next 
section) and on: contextual factors (e.g. the possibility to access the labour market in 
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source countries or community); programme design and implementation features (in 
particular, the transfer amount); beneficiary characteristics (gender, skills and 
poverty levels); and on the reasons that lead households to migrate (Hagen-Zanker 
and Himmelstine 2012). A cross-country study on this issue was developed by 
Greenwood et al. (1999, 2011). The studies, relying on an ad hoc database and on a 
cross-sectional time-series analysis, focused on the influence of social programmes in 
origin countries on migration to the United States. The authors found that the 
existence of old- age programmes, unemployment insurance programmes, and to a 
lesser extent sickness and medical programmes in origin countries, discourages the 
movement to the U.S.A. and that programmes affect the skills composition of migrants. 
Indeed, as showed by Greenwood et al. (1999) different types of social protection 
programmes may produce different impacts on beneficiaries. For instance, old-age 
grants may be used by working age individuals within the household to migrate (Posel 
et al. 2006).  
Our focus is on the impact of conditional cash transfer programmes on migration, to 
our knowledge less explored in the literature. Moreover, there are no studies able to 
disentangle the effect of the cash transfer from the one of the conditionalities in 
affecting migration. Indeed, children school attendance or regular health check-up 
may affect the decision to migrate for people affected by conditionalities within the 
household (Steklov et al., 2005). Conditionalities may have different effect in the short 
and in the long run. In the short run, they may influence households to stay in the 
origin community. However, if conditionalities positively affect schooling, the child, 
once he/she complete the secondary grade may decide to migrate to areas with higher 
returns to education (see Behrman et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, the analysis of migration patterns should be made at both individual 
and household level because the programme design may differently affect migration 
choices of specific members within the household. For instance, in several countries, 
recipients of conditional cash transfer programmes are women and this may affect 
both household and women migration, but to a lesser extent the migration of the male 
within the household.  Unfortunately, available data on these topics do not always 
allow to disentangle household and individual migration and no experiments are 
available about the specific role of conditionalities in affecting migration.  
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The paper focuses on the impact conditional cash transfers on internal migration and, 
to the extent allowed by the data, also analyses the role of conditionalities. Existing 
evidence about conditional cash transfers shows that in Mexico and Honduras, these 
programmes do not significantly affect beneficiaries domestic migration 
(Angelucci,2011; Stecklov et al. 2005; Winters et al 2005) while Bolsa Familia 
decreases the probability to migrate for Brazilian beneficiaries (Neto 2008). 
Conversely, in Nicaragua, conditional cash transfers increase the probability to 
migrate for beneficiaries (Winters et al 2005).  
  
c. Do Social Transfers crowd-out private transfers? 
As reported in Section 1, the effect of cash transfers on migration may be mediated by 
the fact that cash transfers may crowd-out private transfers. If this happens the 
increase in income (due to the cash transfers) is compensated by the loss of private 
transfers, there is not a real increase in the opportunity cost of moving and we may 
expect no effect on migration. Conversely, if cash transfers do not crowd-out private 
transfers, there is an increase in income sources diversification and in the opportunity 
cost of moving. In this case, ceteris paribus, we expect cash transfers deterring 
migration. Cox (1987) compares two motives for private transfers: altruism (Becker, 
1974) and exchange (Bernheim, 1986).  
These “motives” affect the impact of public transfer on privates. If “altruism” prevails, 
public transfers may be offset by the reduction of private transfers; while in case of 
an “exchange motive” this would not be the case. Cox et al. (1987) shows that the 
“exchange motive” is prevalent for private transfers. This result was further 
confirmed relying on data from Peru showing that public transfers, not only do not 
crowd-out the private ones but, may reinforce them (Cox et al. 1998). Oruč (2011) 
confirms that social transfers are able to crowd-in remittances in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Also, Maluccio and Flores (2005) do not find a significant effect of conditional cash 
transfers on remittances in Nicaragua while Jensen (2003) found in South Africa an 
opposite evidence showing that private transfers decrease of around 25% in response 
to public transfers.  
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3. The Juntos Programme16  
Juntos is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme implemented in 2005 by the 
Government of Peru to reduce poverty and improve education and health status 
(Perova and Vakis 2009).  
Juntos beneficiaries are selected through: (i) a geographical targeting (selects 
districts according to exposure to violence; poverty; children malnutrition); (ii) a 
proxy means test (which identifies poor households) combined with a categorical 
targeting (selecting only households with pregnant women or children aged less than 
141); (iii) a community-based targeting (to refine the list produced by the other 
targeting mechanisms) (Perova and Vakis 2009). 
The conditionalities attached to the transfer require households: at least 85% of 
school attendance during the school year for children in school age and regular health 
check-up for children under 5 and pregnant women (Perova and Vakis 2009; Alcázar 
and Espinoza 2014). According to the official data reported by the Juntos Team (2017) 
in the first two months of 2017, 97.3% of targeted households complied with the 
required conditionalities at least in one of the two months.  
The transfer amount is 100 Peruvian Nuevos Soles (around 30 USD) and is delivered 
monthly through bank deposits or with armored van in remote areas. Even though 
the transfer is addressed to the household, the person entitled to collect the benefits 
are women. In some community the programme promotes also some accompanying 
measures, such as awareness seminars on nutrition, family practices, health, 
sanitation, literacy, and productive activities.  
Juntos was first implemented in the poorest areas and then extended to other areas.  
The programme was not designed only for rural population but, in its initial stage, 
was concentrated mainly in these areas because they were the poorest ones (Trivelli 
& Díaz 2010). The concentration of the programme in these areas matters for the 
study of migration because rural districts are also the place of origin of the internal 
migration in Peru (as showed in Figure 1). An impact on poverty reduction, utilization 
of health services, improvement of nutritional intake and increase in primary 
education was detected (Perova and Vakis 2009). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies about Juntos and internal migration in Peru. 
                                                          
16 This section, which describes the programme, is based on the analogous section of Chapter 1 
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4. Data 
To develop the analysis, we rely on the Young Lives database (which was described 
in detail in Chapter 1 and briefly presented here). In order to have a sample of 
comparable households (both poor and better-off), the Young Lives team 
implemented a multi-stage sampling strategy selecting sites located in poor areas 
(relying on a national poverty map) and then randomly selecting small geographic 
areas and then households and children (Young Lives Method Guide, 2011).  
The coverage of rural, urban, peri-urban and Amazonian areas was ensured. Young 
Lives Database was not intended to be nationally representative, however, the Peru 
survey was compared with other surveys showing that households poverty rates 
were similar to the ones of ENAHO 2001 but slightly better-off than the ones surveyed 
by DHS 2000 in terms of access to health and prenatal care services (Escobal and 
Flores, 2008).  Therefore, the survey can be considered representative enough to 
conduct the analysis. Data were collected in 4 rounds: Round 1 was conducted in 
2002, when the Juntos programme was still not in place, Round 2 in 2006, but still did 
not contain questions about households’ participation in the programme, Round 3 
(conducted in 2009) and Round 4 (in 2013) contain questions on the status of 
beneficiaries/non beneficiaries. In each round 2,766 households were surveyed. 
There are two types of households in the Young Lives questionnaire. Those having a 
surveyed child aged 1 year old during the first round (Younger Cohort) and those 
having a surveyed child aged 8 years during the first round (Older Cohort). 
a. Young Lives Data about Migration  
The advantage to use this data to study internal migration consists in the fact that 
Young Lives keeps track of all children in the cohort, even if they change location. The 
tracking system is based on the collection of names and address of two contacts 
within the community but outside the household to ask information in case that the 
household move to a new location. Between rounds fieldworkers verify each 
household location and look for the new location in case of migration (Young 
Lives,2011). 
We built a variable for migration which is based on the change in the place of 
residence reported by field worker. The place of residence is at household level, 
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therefore we consider the household as the decision-making unit for migration. In the 
questionnaire there are also questions about migration at household and child level. 
At the household level, the questionnaire asks households if they moved between 
Round 2 and Round 3, however this information is not perfectly consistent with 
migration dummy we built basing on the change in the place code recorded by the 
fieldworkers who visited the household17. This could be due to the fact that 
households moved between Round 2 and Round 3 but then they came back again to 
the place of origin. For this reason, we consider more reliable the information directly 
documented by fieldworkers who visited the place where the household is actually 
living. Additionally, we are interested in capturing households migration between the 
baseline and Round 3, instead of looking only at migration between Round 2 (when 
the programme was already announced) and Round 3.  Before starting our analysis, 
we show some descriptive statistics about self-reported migration and migration 
documented by fieldworkers (see Table 1) between Round 1 (2002) and Round 3 
(2009).  
Table 1: Rural Urban migration Between Round 1 and Round 3 
 Migrant 
households (%) 
Beneficiaries migrant 
households (%) 
Non-beneficiaries 
migrant households 
(%) 
Rural-Urban migration       5.05 4.81 5.32 
 
5. Empirical analysis  
The objective of our analysis is to study the impact of Juntos on households’ decision 
to migrate. In order to study this issue, we need to identify a reliable counterfactual. 
In absence of experimental data where households are randomly selected into the 
programme, we address the issue of the selection bias relying on quasi-experimental 
methods. In particular, we want to ensure that the treated group is compared with a 
group that is similar on average to avoid that permanent differences across the two 
groups may influence the outcome biasing the real effect of the treatment. Before to 
                                                          
17 Between Round 2 and Round 3, 19.23% of the households head reported to have migrated, while 
according to fieldworkers 17.33% moved. Self-reported migration alone does not allow us to 
disentangle rural-urban migration from other types of migration (urban-rural or rural-rural).  
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perform the analysis, we checked whether there could be a reverse causality between 
migration and Juntos participation.  
Therefore, we checked whether people moved to departments targeted by the 
programme in order to be selected as beneficiaries. From the descriptive statistics we 
know that a very low percentage of households move to departments targeted by 
Juntos and very few migrant households were then selected by the programme (see 
Table 2). Moreover, the correlation between migration and Juntos participation is 
negative and very low, therefore we can exclude the existence of a reverse causality. 
Table 2: Migration to Juntos Departments 
 
From 2002 to 2006 From 2006 to 2009 
Move to a Juntos Department 17 households  
(0.67% of the sample)  
57 households  
(2.2% of the sample)  
Selected by Juntos in Round 3 2 households 8 households 
a. Methods 
In order to address the issue of the selection bias we rely on a quasi-experimental 
technique, the Propensity Score Matching, firstly introduced by Rubin (1974), 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985). Through the propensity score, our objective is 
to select a control group that is similar to the treatment group in all the relevant 
preprogramme characteristics. To implement the Propensity Score Matching we rely 
on the Conditional Independence Assumption, assuming that we can observe 
variables that influence the selection into treatment and the outcomes of interest 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). Given the structure of the data, we can rely on pre-
programme characteristics to build the propensity score, since the variables included 
in the matching have to be measured before the programme or to be time invariant 
variables not affected by the treatment. Therefore, we calculate the probability of 
being beneficiary in Round 3 given a set of baseline characteristics required by the 
targeting criteria and some other households’ demographic and educational 
characteristics. As reported in Section 3, the targeting strategy of Juntos includes 
geographical targeting, categorical targeting, proxy-means test and community-based 
targeting. To take into account the variables used for the geographical targeting, we 
calculate and include in the propensity score the percentage of crime and of stunting 
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children registered in each community. Then, to account for the categorical 
component of the targeting strategy, we include a dummy equal to one when, within 
the household, there is at least one child aged under 7 in 2002, so that in 2009 the 
household could be still eligible for the programme having at least one child aged less 
than 14. Then we also rely on proxies of the household poverty level such as the 
wealth index (which includes the housing quality index, consumer durables index and 
access to services). Finally, we include other characteristics, such as: the household 
size, the educational level of children caregiver, the region of origin, the age and sex 
of the household head (see Appendix 2.1 for propensity score estimates).  
The balancing property and the common support assumptions are respected. 
However, through a visual analysis (see Figure 2) we found that the density in the 
right tail of the propensity score distribution is very thin for the control group.  
Figure 2: Propensity Score distribution for Treated and Controls 
 
We check the actual distribution of treated and control units in Table 3, showing that 
for high values of the propensity score (which in the last block of the distribution 
correspond to propensity score higher than 0.83), the common support assumption 
is respected (since we have 19 controls against 63 treated) but is weak. To overcome 
similar issues, Smith and Todd (2005) suggest using a trimming procedure to 
determine the common support region, by selecting only observations with a 
probability which exceed a given threshold by a certain amount. Hence, to allow a 
stronger level of comparability between the treated and the control group, we decided 
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to trim the common support region by excluding observations with a propensity score 
higher than 0.83 (corresponding to the last block of observations calculated through 
the propensity score).  
Table 3: Common Support Assumption for high values of the propensity score 
JUNTOS P. Score<0.83 P. Score>0.83 Total 
N. Controls 1255 19 1274 
N. Treated 358 63 421 
Total 1613 82 1695 
 
After the implementation of the propensity score, we show that the two groups are 
not significantly different on average (Table 4), therefore we can rely on a reliable 
counterfactual for our treated observations. 
Table 4: Comparison between Treated and Untreated after the Propensity Score 
Matching 
  Mean in Treated Mean in Untreated p-value for diff. 
Rural area=1 0.80 0.82 0.537 
Percentage of households 
reporting crime in the 
community 
0.08 0.08 0.479 
Percentage of households 
reporting stunting children in 
the community 
0.48 0.48 0.625 
Presence of children under 7 in 
the household=1 
0.99 0.99 0.956 
Wealth Index 0.22 0.21 0.430 
Household size 6.14 6.17 0.881 
Caregiver is literate=1 0.30 0.30 0.831 
Sierra Region 1.00 0.97 0.445 
Selva Region 0.00 0.01 0.758 
HH Head Sex 0.89 0.89 0.991 
HH Head Age 35.53 35.98 0.615 
Having addressed the issue of the selection-bias, we estimate the Average Treatment 
effect on Treated (ATT) for Round 3: 
𝑨𝑻𝑻 =  𝑬(𝒀𝟏 − 𝒀𝟎| 𝑻 = 𝟏) 
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where, Y is a dummy variable equal to one when the household moves from rural to 
urban areas and zero otherwise (e.g. when the household does not move between 
rounds or moves from urban to rural areas). This variable was built relying on the 
changes in the place of residence registered between the survey rounds. This data is 
reported by field worker who, thanks to a tracking system, may find and interview 
household also if they change locality. In our sample, 5% of the households migrate 
from rural to urban areas between Round 1 and Round 3. To calculate the ATT we rely 
on different matching algorithms: the Nearest Neighbour matching (each treated 
individual is compared to the closest untreated individual in terms of propensity 
score); the stratification matching (that compare the outcome mean of treated and 
untreated individuals within each block of observations); and the Kernel Matching 
(that rely on the weighted average of all the untreated individuals assigning more 
weight to comparison units similar to the treated units). The choice about the 
algorithm to use may be important, in particular in cases of a small sample 
(particularly, with few control units), when there could be a trade-off between bias 
and variance which may lead to different results across methods (Caliendo et al. 
2005). Instead, in case of large samples, all PSM estimators should bring to similar 
results as they are more able to identify and compare only exact matches (Smith 
2000). Indeed, in our case we implement three different methods and results are very 
robust across them.  
6. Results 
In Table 5 we show that the Average Treatment effect on the Treated coefficient is 
negative, meaning that the programme discourages migration from rural to urban 
areas and results are very robust using different matching methods (namely: Nearest 
Neighbor; Stratification; and Kernel Matching). As explained in Section 4, Young Lives 
keeps track of all children even if they change location thanks to a tracking system.  
Therefore, our outcome variable for migration is based on the change in the place of 
residence, reported by field worker, which is at household level. Therefore, in our 
analysis we consider the household as the decision-making unit for migration. 
Coefficients are negative and significant at 0.1%, indeed beneficiary households are 
significantly less likely to move from rural to urban areas with respect to non-
beneficiaries. 
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Table 5: Programme impact on the decision to migrate from rural to urban 
areas 
Method  ATT S.E. N. Treated N. Controls 
Nearest Neighbor Method  
(random draw version) 
-0.156*** 0.042 358 162 
Stratification Method -0.159*** 0.039 358 1255 
Kernel Matching Method 
(bootstrapped standard 
errors) 
-0.148*** 0.033 358 1255 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on Treated 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Households migrate from rural to urban areas if the expected income in the 
destination place, net of the cost to migrate, is higher than the income in origin 
community. An increase in households’ income due to a cash transfer provided by the 
government reduces the gap between the current household income and the expected 
net gain in the destination country. Indeed, conditional cash transfer programmes 
increases the opportunity cost to migrate providing an additional source of income 
for beneficiaries. The increase in the opportunity-cost to migrate is possible if cash 
transfers do not crowd-out private transfers. Conversely, if public transfers crowd-
out private transfers the increase in income due to cash transfers is offset by the loss 
of private transfers and in this case, we could expect that the programme does not 
produce any impact on migration flows. To confirm this hypothesis, we also check 
whether Juntos may crowd-out private transfers. As expected, and coherently with 
Cox (1987), in Table 6 we show that Juntos does not seem to have a significant effect 
on private transfers, confirming that they reduce the probability to migrate by 
increasing its opportunity-cost. 
 Table 6: Programme impact on private transfers 
Method  ATT S.E. N. Treated N. Controls 
Nearest Neighbor Method  
(random draw version) 
-0.001 0.033 414 157 
Stratification Method 
 
0.016 0.023 414 570 
Kernel Matching Method 
(bootstrapped standard 
errors) 
0.014 0.026 414 570 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on Treated 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Still, one could argue that conditional cash transfers may deter migration also through 
conditionalities, which requires children and a caregiver to stay in the place of origin 
to attend health check-up and school to receive the transfer. If this would be the case, 
Juntos should deter only migration of children and caregiver but not the one of other 
household members, who can use part of the transfer to fund migration cost. 
Conversely, if the increase in the opportunity cost of moving is the leading reason 
pushing households to avoid migration we can expect that the programme is able to 
deter not only migration of the whole household (as showed in Table 5) but also 
migration of single household members. To confirm our hypothesis, we perform an 
additional analysis on the probability that at least one household member, who was 
present in Round 1 and Round 2, leaves the household in Round 3. We focus our 
analysis only on working age members (aged between 18 and 65 in Round 3) 
excluding people who died and labourer, tenant or servant who were living within the 
household. It is worth noting that results must be read with cautions since the sample 
include both people who migrate and people who leaves the household for other 
reason (e.g. to form a new household). Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle these 
two motives due to data limitations.  
Results, reported in Table 7, confirm our hypothesis showing that the programme 
negatively affects also the probability that at least one working age household 
member leaves the household.  
Table 7: Programme impact on the probability that at least one working age member 
leaves the household  
Method  ATT S.E. N. Treated N. Controls 
Nearest Neighbor Method  
(random draw version) 
-0.143 **        0.047 414 160 
Stratification Method 
 
-0.101*        0.043    414 570 
Kernel Matching Method 
(bootstrapped standard 
errors) 
-0.084*        0.038 414 570 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on Treated 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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7. Robustness Check 
The first robustness check consists in testing our hypothesis only on the Sierra region, 
since 99% of beneficiaries live there. We confirm that Juntos discourages migration 
from rural to urban areas (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Programme impact on the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas  
(Sierra region only)  
Method  ATT S.E. N. Treated N. Controls 
Nearest Neighbor Method  
(random draw version) 
-0.162*** 0.038 414 160 
Stratification Method 
 
-0.145 *** 0.042 414 570 
Kernel Matching Method 
(bootstrapped standard 
errors) 
-0.127*** 0.032 414 570 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on Treated 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Then, we also check whether results are confirmed using outcome variables from 
Round 4. In particular, we compare households in the common support who were 
beneficiaries in both Round 3 and Round 4 against people who were never 
beneficiaries (see Table 9). Relying on data from Round 4, we confirm that the Juntos 
programme has a negative and significant effect on the households’ probability to 
migrate from rural to urban areas. 
Table 9: Programme impact on the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas – 
Round 4 
Method  ATT S.E. N. Treated N. Controls 
Nearest Neighbor Method  
(random draw version) 
-0.181** 0.057 298 129 
Stratification Method 
 
-0.181*** 0.051 298 490 
Kernel Matching Method 
(bootstrapped standard 
errors) 
-0.196*** 0.043 298 490 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on Treated 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether welfare programmes affect internal migration in 
Peru. In particular, we analyse the impact of a conditional cash transfer programme, 
Juntos, on the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas. The internal migration is 
an important issue in Peru and at the global level, since there is a massive migration 
from rural to urban areas that is likely to continue also in the future.  
Through Propensity Score Matching methods, we found that beneficiary households 
are significantly less likely to migrate with respect to similar non-beneficiaries. 
Indeed, the Juntos programme discourages households to leave the rural setting and 
to move to urban areas. One mechanism through which Juntos may negatively affect 
migration is the increase in the opportunity cost of moving. This mechanism is 
possible only if cash transfers do not crowd-out private transfers. Conversely, if public 
transfers crowd-out private transfers the increase in income due to cash transfers is 
offset by the loss of private transfers and, in this case, the programme may not 
produce any impact on migration flows. We show that Juntos deters migration by 
increasing the opportunity cost to migrate, since it does not crowd-out private 
transfers allowing a real increase in household income.  
Conditionalities require school attendance and regular health check-up in the place of 
origin, hence may deter migration for children and caregiver who are the target 
individuals required to accomplish with conditionalities. However, they are not 
supposed to affect migration decisions of other household members who can decide 
to use part of the transfer to fund the migration cost. To confirm our hypothesis that 
the increase in the opportunity cost is the leading reason pushing individuals to avoid 
migration we show that the programme is able to deter not only migration of the 
whole household (which can be constrained by conditionalities) but also migration of 
single household members who are not constrained by conditionalities.  
The main results are robust also using outcome variables from another survey round, 
showing also a sustained impact of the programme over time. Our study confirms the 
hypothesis that the introduction of welfare interventions in the place of origin 
produce better economic conditions, which may allow the households not to migrate 
but to stay in the place of origin. This finding may have concrete policy implications 
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only for settings and cases where the main reason to migrate can be identified in 
economics constraints. There are cases when migration is motivated by conflicts in 
the place of origin, in this case the reasons that push households to migrate are not 
economic and, additionally, in these settings there are several difficulties even in 
financing and delivering social protection benefits. In cases of migration motivated by 
climate changes, social transfers may support the households but in the long-run 
climate shocks affect, not only the economic conditions, but also working 
opportunities and social interactions.  
The reduction of rural-urban migration per se cannot be judged as a positive or a 
negative phenomenon but its impact on poverty may have strong implications in 
developing countries. Recently, Imai et al. (2017) showed that the increased 
population in mega cities and in secondary towns seem not to be associated with 
poverty reduction, while policies and investments in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors for rural areas may have a stronger impact on poverty. Our research shows 
that welfare interventions may make migration a choice, by increasing households’ 
income allowing them to decide freely where to leave and to stay in the place of origin 
with better economic conditions. Indeed, this finding has important policy 
implications in cases when migration is motivated by economic reasons and when all 
the other social, political and environmental conditions are stable. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Table 2.1: Propensity Score Estimates 
 Juntos  
 (Beneficiary=1 in Round 3) 
Area of residence (rural=1) 0.723** 
 (0.189) 
  
Percentage of households reporting crimes in each 
community  
-0.690** 
(1.665) 
  
  
Percentage of stunted children in the community 1.892*** 
 (0.589) 
  
Presence of children under 7 (at baseline) within the 
household 
0.522 
(0.516) 
  
  
Wealth index -2.749*** 
 (0.601) 
  
Household size 0.386 
 (0.0393) 
  
Caregiver is literate=1 -1.009*** 
 (0.165) 
  
Sierra region 5.277*** 
 (1.018) 
  
Selva region -1.617 
 (1.432) 
  
Sex of household head -0.184 
 (0.245) 
  
Age of household head -0.545* 
 (0.00719) 
N 2,550 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Chapter 3 
Conditional Cash Transfers and Aspirations in Peru 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an impact evaluation of the Peruvian conditional 
cash transfer programme, Juntos, on children aspirations related to education and 
future work opportunities. Relying on Inverse Probability Weighting, we show that the 
programme positively and significantly affects children. We show that the programme 
does not increase children aspirations through an economic channel. Conversely, we 
identify a psychosocial effect showing that Juntos has a stronger effect for beneficiary 
children who feel included in the community and at school with respect to children who 
perceive stigma.  
 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfers; Impact Evaluation; Aspirations; Peru; Juntos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
1. Introduction 
Aspirations are commonly defined as desires, as something that people hope to 
achieve. In Appadurai’s (2004) view, aspirations are strongly affected by the level of 
well-being and poor people may lack the “capacity to aspire”. At the same time, low 
aspirations may lead individuals to remain trapped in poverty, creating a vicious cycle 
(Ray 2006). According to Dalton et al. (2016) “the aspiration failure is a consequence 
of poverty, rather than a cause”. The “aspiration failure” of poor people, is due to the 
fact they face higher risk and costs of efforts than rich people, therefore they make 
less effort to realize their initial aspirations with the consequence of lower expected 
marginal benefits, which in turn make their initial aspirations diverging from the one 
of better-off people.  
Why do aspirations matter? They have an intrinsic value because, in particular for 
children, they represent the freedom to desire. Additionally, parents and children 
aspirations about education and future work may concretely affect current 
individuals’ preferences for school. There is evidence of the fact that educational 
aspirations positively affect years of schooling and educational attainment (Serneels 
and Dercon, 2014; Chiapa et al. 2012). Using the Young Lives survey in Peru, we show 
that children educational aspirations are positively correlated to real outcome and, in 
particular, to the grade (year of education) completed by children four years later (see 
Figure 1).   
Figure 1: Correlation between educational aspirations and outcomes 
 
Note: This Figure shows the correlation between children aspiration about years of education in 2009 
and actual years of education reached four years later, in 2013. The coding for the years of education 
can be found in Annex 3.1. The sample of children analyzed in this figure was aged 14/15 years in 2009.  
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According to Ray (2006), aspirations affect behaviours depending on the size of the 
“aspiration gap”, this is the difference between the current individual status and the 
one to which the individual aspires to. An individual may change behaviour and make 
some kind of investment in order to reduce the “aspiration gap”, but this works only 
when the gap is not too small or too large (because when the gap is too small 
individuals would not put effort to achieve a status similar to the current one; while 
when the gap is too large, despite the effort, it would remain too huge to overcome). 
Ross (2017) provided some empirical support to the “aspiration gap” theory. Using 
data from India he found an inverted-U relationship between the children “gap” in 
work aspirations and the real education outcomes.  
Aspirations are shaped by individual characteristics (such as: optimistic or 
pessimistic attitude, ethnicity, sense of identity) but they are likely not to be constant 
over time and to vary according to personal experiences and social changes. 
Aspirations changes may be determined by modifications in the awareness of its own 
self-perception (Mukherjee 2015), by inspirational experiences (Bernard et al. 2014, 
Wydick 2013) or by social programmes. Genicot and Ray (2017) model how social 
outcomes external to the individual may affect aspirations, and show that aspirations 
evolves jointly, not only with income, but also with its distribution. 
Studying what may affect initial aspirations is relevant from a policy perspective 
because what people desire changes over time and has an impact on effort and 
achievements. The aim of this paper is to study whether conditional cash transfers 
may affect children and adolescents’ aspirations related to future education and work. 
Relying on Young Lives data and implementing Inverse Probability Weighting, we 
show that the Peruvian conditional cash transfer programme, Juntos, positively 
affects children aspirations. 
Conditional cash transfers are at the core of social protection policies in many 
developing countries and their main objective is to improve education, health, and 
reduce child labour. If sending children to school would be efficient, parents should 
decide to do it even without the enforcement of conditionalities but there are several 
reasons why parents may underinvest in education (imperfect information about the 
returns to education, low will-power in assessing the future utility derived by current 
choices, low altruism level due to the impossibility to enforce reciprocity when they 
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provide informal transfers to their children) (Fiszbein et al. 2009). These distortions 
may justify government intervention in the economy in view of the private optimum 
of each family but also of welfare maximization at the aggregate level. Unconditional 
cash transfers generate an “income effect” for the household which avoid the 
implementation of detrimental risk coping strategies (as child drop-out from school 
in case of negative shocks), while the attachment of a conditionality to the cash 
transfer may produce also a “substitution effect”, because remunerating education 
lowers the opportunity cost of studying with respect to work (ibid.). Thus, conditional 
cash transfers create an economic incentive for households to invest in education. 
From an economic perspective, this is the main channel through which conditional 
cash transfers affect education and, in turn, future work opportunities. In our paper, 
we consider that parents may underinvest in children education, not only for the 
aforementioned economic reasons, but also because they may “lack the capacity to 
aspire” to a better future for their children. 
In our main analysis we check whether conditional cash transfers affect aspirations 
but then we also try to shed a light on the mechanisms and the channels through 
which this process takes place. In particular, we focus on two channels: the “economic 
channel” and the programme “psychosocial channel”.  For what concerns the 
“economic channel”, the injection of liquidity within the households increases income 
and improves the household well-being; this in turn may reduce the wealth gap 
between the poor and the better-off. According to Dalton et al. (2016), poor people, 
with respect to rich people, experience an “aspiration failure” and have lower 
aspirations because the expected marginal benefit of the effort to reach their 
aspirations is lower, due to the fact that they face higher risk and costs of efforts. 
Stringent initial external constraints (such as low wealth) determine low effort-low 
aspirations (ibid.). In our view, conditional cash transfers, through the injection of 
liquidity within the household and the provision of a secure source of income, may 
reduce the wealth gap between poor and better-off and alter the propensity to make 
some kind of effort (or investment)18.  
                                                          
18 See Bastagli et al. 2016, for a review of the impact of CCTs on different kinds of investments. 
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In turn, this affects the initial gap between poor and the rich people aspirations 
reducing the likelihood of an “aspiration failure”19.  
We also focus on the programme “psychosocial channel”, since being part of the 
programme may have two opposite effects on stigma, well summarized by Roelen 
(2017): (i) cash transfers can reduce the stigma by improving mental health (Samuels 
and Stavropoulou 2016), reducing the need for private loans (Berhane et al. 2012) or 
by allowing children to have new clothes and to be cleaner (Adato et al 2016). This 
improvement in people life may make them more prone to aspire; (ii) cash transfers, 
on the other hand, may trigger a negative effect on stigma due to: the targeting 
mechanism if it requires that people publicly reveal their intent to participate to the 
programme (Coady et al. 2004); to the payment mechanism, if it requires people to 
queue in front of the payment office (Bastagli et al. 2016); to the behaviour of the 
programme staff and of the rest of the community (Wright et al. 2014). In this case 
revealing and priming the fact of being poor in front of the community may negatively 
affect people aspirations (Mukherjee 2015).20 Through these mechanisms conditional 
cash transfers may affect people capacity to aspire. This paper contributes to the 
recent literature about the role of aspirations in poor settings and provide additional 
evidence of the fact that they are endogenous to economic, social and psychological 
changes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper assessing the impact of 
Juntos on Peruvian children aspirations. Most importantly we explore the economic 
and the psychosocial mechanisms through which conditional cash transfers may 
affect aspirations. This recent strand of literature may have important policy 
implications, since it highlights that the impact of conditional cash transfers on 
schooling and human capital may be amplified also by changes in children aspirations.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the 
literature about cash transfers and aspirations; in section 3 we describe the Juntos 
programme; in section 4 we present the Young lives data and their value added in 
terms of information about children aspirations; in section 5 we explain the method 
                                                          
19 It is worth noting that, Dalton et al (2016) identify one standard and one behavioural poverty trap 
and for some ranges of initial wealth the poverty trap can be broken by acting only on aspirations. 
However, for very low levels of wealth also material constraints should be addressed. 
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used for the analysis; section 6 shows the main findings of this paper and section 7 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Aspirations are shaped by individual characteristics but can also be affected by life 
experiences and by social and economic changes. The modifications in the awareness 
of its own self-perception, the exposure to inspirational experiences or to certain 
models may contribute to form people aspirations during the life-cycle. Mukherjee 
(2015) showed that aspirations of Indian people changed after a psychological 
exercise based on identity priming. Also, aspirational models or movies may produce 
effects on aspirations formation. Bernard et al. (2014) showed that people who 
watched an “aspirational” documentary, about successful stories of similar people 
working in agriculture or small business, experienced an increase in aspirations 
which was then translated in forward-looking behaviours (savings and investments 
in children education). This effect persisted even five years after the intervention, 
when in treated villages the level of aspirations, the percentage of children enrolled 
at school and the number of owned assets, was higher with respect to the control 
villages (Bernard et al. 2017). In Uganda, students who watched the aspirational 
“Queen of Katwe” movie, before the math test, performed better than students who 
watched a placebo movie and this result was stronger for girls and lower performing 
students (Riley 2018). Beaman et al. (2012), show that reserving leadership positions 
for women, in randomly selected Indian villages, increased girls’ aspirations due to a 
role model effect. Indeed, adolescent girls, who live in villages where there is a female 
leader, raise their aspirations reducing the gender aspirations gap.  
Besides experiences that alter the psychological self-perception, also awareness and 
inclusion activities may affect people aspirations. For instance, in India the provision 
of information about new economic sectors and the opportunities of news jobs in 
those sectors influenced women aspirations regarding their career and push them to 
study longer (Jensen 2012). Furthermore, both Wydick et al. (2013) and Glewwe et 
al. (2015), found that child sponsorship programmes influence the capacity to aspire, 
which in turn positively affect years of schooling, school completion, and the quality 
of future employment.  
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Finally, also social programmes, such as conditional cash transfer programmes may 
have an impact on people aspirations. This channel has been only recently highlighted 
and the literature is still scarce. However, most studies find a positive effect on 
parents and children aspirations.  Chiapa et al. (2012), analyse the impact of the 
PROGRESA programme on parents’ educational aspirations for their children in terms 
of years of schooling, and they found that the programme is significantly associated 
with an increase in educational aspirations in terms of year of schooling. They also 
studied one of the “conditionalities effect” on aspirations, and in particular the fact 
that households with very young children must attend regular health check-up, so 
they were exposed to highly educated professionals, which seems to positively affect 
the desired school years. Additionally, they showed that parents aspirations for their 
children to complete “college” increase thanks to the programme and these results 
depend, partially, on the “conditionality effect” of exposure to educated professionals. 
This result is in line with the one of Macours and Vakis (2014) who showed that, in 
Nicaragua, conditional cash transfer beneficiaries exposed to social interactions with 
programme female leaders increased their aspirations for the future. The authors find 
that this effect was driven by the fact that people were exposed to positive and 
successful examples.  
The case of the Colombian CCT, Familias en Accion, was studied by Contreras Suarez 
and Cameron (2016) and Garcia et al. (2016), with contrasting results. Contreras 
Suarez and Cameron (2016) did not find a programme effect on aspirations while 
Garcia et al. (2016) find a positive programme impact to attain post-secondary 
education, in particular for the poorest, more pessimistic and less educated 
households. The difference between these results was explained on the ground that 
the former studied the long-term effect of the programme, while the latter analysed 
the short-term programme impact basing the study on a time span when the 
programme included also workshops for beneficiaries (that allow interactions with 
educated professionals), which were then changed or removed some years after the 
programme started (Garcia et al. 2016).  
Other authors analyse the impact of unconditional cash transfers, microfinance, or 
cash-for-work programmes and find that also these programmes are able to produce 
an impact on aspirations. Gebremariam et al. (2017) analyse the Productive Safety 
Net Programme in Ethiopia and find that the intervention positively affects children 
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aspirations about the years of schooling. In Mexico, also microfinance loans for 
indigenous people had a positive impact on hope and aspirations (Lybbert and 
Wydick, 2016). Ross (2017) find that the India’s National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA) increases the level of aspirations of Indian children but is not 
able to significantly affect the size of the “aspiration gap” in a way to affect the level of 
investment in human capital.  Since these authors show that also unconditional cash 
transfers may have an effect on aspirations, in absence of experimental evidence and 
relying on the scarce existing literature, we could speculate that beyond the 
“conditionalities channel” also the economic and the programme inclusion channels 
may play a role in affecting aspirations.  
3. The Juntos Programme21  
Juntos is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme first implemented in 2005 by 
the Government of Peru with the objective to reduce poverty in the short and in long-
run, respectively by transferring cash to the households and improving education and 
health (through the conditionalities attached to cash transfers) (Perova and Vakis 
2009). The programme was able to reach the intended effects and it has a positive 
impact on poverty reduction, health services, nutrition and education (ibid.). In 2018, 
the programme covers 765,380 households in 1,325 districts22. According to the 
qualitative evidence, some beneficiary reported that the conditionalities related to 
education were valued by parent as a way for their children to reach higher 
professional positions in the future (Juntos 2010)23. 
There are two different types of conditionalities that households are required to 
comply in order to receive the transfer; they apply differently according to the 
children’s age. Children in school age should attend at least 85% of the school year, 
while children under 5 and pregnant women must attend regular health check-up 
(Perova and Vakis 2009; Alcázar and Espinoza 2014). According to the official data 
reported by the Juntos Team (2018) in the second quarter of 2018, 97.8% of 
                                                          
21 This section, which describes the programme, is based on the analogous section of Chapter 1 
22 See http://www.juntos.gob.pe/modulos/mod_infojuntos/ 
23 “¿Qué fue lo que más le gustó de JUNTOS? Desde el principio me gustó la educación…Para que supere 
más pe, para que rinde más en su estudio, que sea mañana, más tarde un profesional”(Beneficiary of 
Puncupata) (Juntos 2010). “sueño con que mi hija pueda ser doctora, mientras no me pase nada, yo 
apoyaré a mi hija para que salga adelante" (Juntos 2009).  
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households complied with the required conditionalities at least in one month. 
Households are selected by the programme through the implementation of different 
targeting mechanisms at both geographical and household level. First, the programme 
selects districts according to: exposure to violence; poverty level, measured as a 
proportion of population with unsatisfied basic needs; poverty gap; level of child 
malnutrition; and presence of extreme income poverty (Perova and Vakis 2009). 
Then, a proxy means test is combined with a categorical targeting to select poor and 
vulnerable households with pregnant women or children under 1424. Finally, a team 
in each community validated the lists produced by the other targeting mechanisms. A 
transfer of 100 Peruvian Nuevos Soles (around 30 USD) is delivered monthly, to the 
women within the households, through bank deposits or, in remote areas, with 
armored van. In some case, the programme promotes some accompanying measures, 
namely beneficiaries’ participation in awareness seminars on nutrition, family 
practices, health, sanitation, literacy, and productive activities but, to our knowledge, 
these seminars are promoted only by some community on a voluntary basis.  
4. Data  
We use Young Lives Data (which was described in details in Chapter 1), a longitudinal 
households survey collected in four rounds; in each round 2,766 households were 
surveyed. In order to have a sample of comparable households (both poor and better-
off), the Young Lives team implemented a multi-stage sampling strategy selecting 
sites located in poor areas and then randomly selecting small geographic areas, 
households and children (Young Lives Method Guide, 2011). There are two types of 
households in the Young Lives questionnaire: those having a surveyed child aged 1 
year old during the first round (Younger Cohort) and those having a surveyed child 
aged 8 years during the first round (Older Cohort). Round 1 was conducted in 2002, 
when the Juntos programme was still not in place, Round 2 in 2006, but still did not 
contain questions about households’ participation in the programme, Round 3 (2009) 
and Round 4 (2013) embody questions on the status of beneficiaries/non-
beneficiaries. Young Lives Database can be considered representative enough to 
conduct the analysis, since household’s poverty rates were similar to the ones 
                                                          
24 In 2012 the eligibility criteria slightly changed and define eligible also households with children aged 
less than 19 (Alcázar and Espinoza 2014). 
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reported by ENAHO 2001 and only slightly better-off (in terms of access to health and 
prenatal care services) than the ones surveyed by DHS 2000 (Escobal and Flores, 
2008).   
a. Young Lives Data on Aspirations 
Young Lives collected a lot of information about children aspirations in Round 2, 
Round 3 and Round 4. For the main analysis, we rely on data from Round 3. In this 
Round, the younger cohort children (around 8 years old) were not surveyed about 
educational aspirations but only about work aspirations. According to Dalton (2016), 
initial aspirations may be formed also by the concrete possibilities to achieve a goal, 
therefore the distinction between aspirations and expectation may be not trivial. 
However, Young Lives questions about aspirations are formulated in a way to avoid 
confusion between aspirations and expectations (which attain more to what people 
would like to achieve given what they can achieve). In particular, the questionnaire 
asks children “Imagine you had no constraints and could study for as long as you liked 
or go back to school if you have already left. What level of formal education would you 
like to complete?” and “What do you want to be when you grow up?”25.  
We use two variables for educational aspirations, one related to the school years and 
one to the completed level of education one aspires to. The coding for work 
aspirations is based on Pasquier-Doumer and Rissa Brandon (2015) who, relying on 
data from ENAHO 2006, assigned a score to each occupational aspiration which is a 
‘linear combination of the average education level required by the occupation and the 
average income it generates’26. Descriptive statistics about children work and 
education aspirations, before the matching, show that aspirations between the 
treated and the control group were very similar (see Appendix 3.2). 
5. Methods 
In absence of experimental data, we implement quasi-experimental techniques. To 
remove the unobservable time invariant differences, the ideal solution would be to 
implement a difference-in-difference technique but unfortunately, the database does 
                                                          
25 See Appendix 3.1 for more details about questions and variables coding. 
26 With respect to Pasquier-Doumer and Brandon (2015) we rely on three groups of work aspirations 
instead of four. 
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not contain questions about education aspirations in Round 1 and only few 
observations about the work aspirations of the older cohort. We could use Round 2 as 
a baseline, but at that time the programme was already announced and in place in 
some community (however, the number of households who are already programme 
beneficiaries was very low, so we cannot use Round 2 for the analysis). Given the 
nature of the data we decided to implement a semi-parametric method based on 
Inverse Probability Weighting. First, we calculate the probability of being 
beneficiaries in Round 3, given the pre-programme characteristics of Round 1, 
through a probit model. We define programme beneficiaries those who reported 
having received transfers for the programme in the last 12 months.  Respectively 
through retrospective questions and variables cross-checking, we excluded 
households who received Juntos in the past (in Round 2) but are no longer 
beneficiaries and households who reported contradictory information. To allow a 
higher level of comparability between the treatment and the control group the 
analysis is based only on people living in the Sierra region, because among the 
households surveyed by Young Lives in 2002, 99% of Juntos beneficiaries live in this 
area in 2009 (Round 3), and the high concentration of beneficiaries found in the YL 
data is confirmed by the administrative data (according to the Ministerio de 
Desarrollo e Inclusión Social (2014), around 83% of the beneficiaries live in Sierra 
districts). Unfortunately, we cannot rely on differences in quotas during the 
programme implementation because all the Sierra departments were targeted by 
Juntos before 2009. First, we include the characteristics used for the geographical 
targeting: the percentage of crime and of stunting children registered in each 
community. Second, we control for the variables used to select households through 
the categorical targeting and the proxy means test: a dummy equal to one when, in 
2002, there is at least one child aged under 7 in the household (so that in 2009 the 
household could be eligible for the programme having at least one child aged less than 
14); and the wealth index (which includes the housing quality index, consumer 
durables index and access to services). Finally, we include other characteristics, such 
as: household size, educational level of children caregiver, children age, sex, first 
language, and children cohort. After the calculation of the propensity score27, we 
                                                          
27 Propensity score estimates are showed in Appendix 3.3 
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compute the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) and through an Hotelling test we 
show that the treated and the control group are not significantly different 
(Prob>F(11,1139)=0.1433). Additionally, we show that at baseline individuals in the 
treated and control group (weighted through the IPW) are not significantly different 
in the relevant characteristics (Table 1). 
Table 1: Comparison between groups  
 
Mean in 
Treated 
Mean in 
Untreated 
P-value for 
difference 
Rural area=1 0.804 0.838 0.231 
Households reporting crime in the community 0.076 0.075 0.931 
Stunting children in the community 0.486 0.508 0.182 
Presence of children under 7 in the household=1 0.986 0.982 0.708 
Wealth Index 0.216 0.207 0.484   
Household size 6.139 6.011 0.617 
Caregiver is literate=1 0.289 0.259 0.466 
Child sex 0.496 0.525 0.627 
Child Age 1.736 2.118 0.257 
Child first language 0.404 0.401 0.958 
Child age cohort 0.825 0.774 0.292 
 
Then we perform an OLS model on Round 3, weighting observations through the 
Inverse Probability Weighting and clustering observations at the community level.  
The estimated model is the following:  
 
𝒀𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑻𝒊 +  𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒔 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 are children aspirations, 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy for the household treatment status; 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of covariates including: wealth index; area of residence; household head 
years of education; household head age; child sex; ethnicity; child's age - in months; 
household size; dependency ratio; child age cohort; 𝜀𝑖𝑠 is the error term and it is 
clustered at community level. 
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6. Results 
We find a positive and significant programme impact of Juntos on children aspirations 
related to years of education and completed level of education (Table 2)28. The two 
coefficients are similar in magnitude and significant respectively at 1% and 5%.  
Table 2: Impact of Juntos on Education and Work Aspirations-Round 3 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
 Older Cohort Older Cohort Both Cohorts 
Juntos 0.164*** 
(0.118) 
0.161** 
(0.112) 
0.040 
(0.0841) 
    
Wealth index 0.180** 
(0.733) 
0.138 
(0.630) 
0.202*** 
(0.423) 
    
Area of residence 
(rural=1) 
-0.001 
(0.118) 
-0.024 
(0.125) 
-0.114** 
(0.105) 
    
Household head years of 
education 
0.017 
(0.0208) 
0.048 
(0.0197) 
-0.006 
(0.0120) 
    
Household head age -0.083 
(0.00928) 
-0.169 
(0.0103) 
-0.024 
(0.00388) 
    
Child sex (Male=1) 0.093 
(0.178) 
0.130 
(0.154) 
-0.115* 
(0.107) 
    
Ethnicity (White=1) 0.059 
(0.339) 
0.056 
(0.238) 
-0.034 
(0.255) 
    
Child's age - in months -0.110 
(0.0327) 
-0.063 
(0.0155) 
0.666* 
(0.00866) 
    
Household size -0.251** 
(0.0567) 
-0.273** 
(0.0501) 
-0.110** 
(0.0243) 
    
Dependency ratio 0.186** 
(0.000994) 
0.231** 
(0.001000) 
0.010 
(0.000732) 
    
Child Age Cohort 
(Younger Cohort=1) 
  0.522 
(0.723) 
N 250 251 1,021 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; Errors are clustered at the community level; 
The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                                                          
28 Appendix 3.4 shows also the impact of Juntos on parents aspirations which we do not report here 
since the focus of the paper is on children aspirations. Moreover, adding parental aspirations as a 
control variable to regressions on education and job aspirations, results are confirmed. 
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As explained in Section 4, the variables related to educational aspirations are 
available for the older cohort only, while it is possible to conduct the analysis on both 
cohorts for what concerns work aspirations. 
The impact of Juntos on work aspirations is not significant, and we investigate 
whether this can be due to some cohort effects. In line with Dalton et al. view (2016), 
this may be due to the fact that people form their aspirations step-by-step. Children 
focus first on education and then on work, once the first objective is fixed, they start 
to create new aspirations for the following step. In Table 3 we find evidence in support 
of this hypothesis showing that the programme affects the older cohort’s work 
aspirations but not the younger cohort’s ones. This cohort effect can be explained also 
with the fact that the Older Cohort children experienced a change in their life (before 
and after the programme) during the adolescence (14/15 years old in Round 3), while 
the younger cohort started to receive the transfer when they were still very young to 
perceive changes in the household status (7/8years old). For this reason, we decided 
to test programme mechanisms and heterogeneous effects for the older cohort only 
(see next section). 
 
Table 3: Cohort Effect 
 Children job aspirations 
Older Cohort 
Juntos 0.204*** 
 (0.109) 
N 227 
  Younger Cohort 
Juntos 0.024 
(0.113) 
N 794 
P-value for difference 0.1556 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; Errors are clustered at the community level; 
The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The two coefficients reported in Table 3 are not significantly different but the p-value 
for the difference between the coefficients is extremely low. Programme Mechanisms 
As reported in Section 1, conditional cash transfers may affect people capacity to 
aspire through two different channels: the “economic channel” and the “programme 
psychosocial channel”. To test the “economic channel”, we check whether the 
programme has a differential impact for children who, at the baseline, have a wealth 
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index below or above the median. Relying on our analysis we cannot identify an 
economic mechanism, the programme has not a differential impact for children whose 
wealth was below or above the median in Round 1 (Table 4). According to Dalton et 
al. (2016), two poverty traps must be taken into account when studying aspirations: 
the standard material poverty trap and the behavioural poverty trap. The initial 
wealth plays a role in the formation of aspirations since there are wealth levels so low 
that individuals may be caught in a poverty trap.  However, in our case we cannot 
identify a material poverty trap which generates differential programme impact on 
aspirations formation (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Economic mechanism 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (level of 
education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Children with WI below the median of the community in Round 1, with controls 
Juntos 0.133* 0.165** 0.226*** 
 (0.173) (0.129) (0.101) 
N 113 113 102 
 
Children with WI above the median of the community in Round 1, with controls 
Juntos 0.367** 0.367** 0.347* 
 (0.229) (0.229) (0.300) 
N 137 137 124 
P-value for difference 0.3910 0.1925 0.3651 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
In Dalton et al. (2016) view, policies should be accompanied by measures acting, not 
only on the standard poverty trap but also, on the behavioural poverty trap, which 
can also generate the aspiration failure. Conditional cash transfer may act on the 
behavioural poverty trap through: (i) conditionalities (which allows social 
interactions and exposure to role model); (ii) by reducing the stigma associated to the 
fact of being poor. As mentioned above, due to data limitations we cannot test the 
conditionality channel for Juntos29. However, we can analyse the “psychosocial 
                                                          
29 Conditionalities may be seen as a measure which acts on aspirations by exposing children to role 
models, such as teachers and doctors. Within the Juntos programme, children aged less than 5 are 
required to attend regular health check-up while children aged more than 6 should attend school. 
According to Chiapa et al. (2012) the exposure to educated professionals (e.g. doctors and nurses) 
positively affected aspirations of mexican beneficiaries of the conditional cash transfer programme, 
PROGRESA. 
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channel” checking whether the effect of Juntos on aspirations is stronger for children 
who are less affected by stigma. While shame consists in a personal evaluation, stigma 
occurs through social interaction with other people (Bos et al. 2013). According to 
Roelen (2017) cash transfers may reduce the stigma associated with the status of poor 
by improving mental health (Samuels and Stavropoulou 2016), reducing the need for 
private loans (Berhane et al. 2012) or by allowing children to have new clothes (Adato 
et al 2016). As a proxy of stigma we decided to rely on an Inclusion Index to check 
whether the programme has a stronger impact for children who feel more included at 
school and in the community. Following Dercon and Singh (2013), we build an index 
relying on the following questions addressed to children: “The other children in my 
class treat me with respect”; “Pupils in my class never tease me at school”; “Adults in my 
community treat me as well as they treat other children at my age”. Children answers 
are on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 to 5 (from being “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”). We create the index by summing the score from each single answer, 
then we calculate the median value of the index for all children and finally we divide 
the sample according to whether children have an Inclusion Index below or above the 
median. From Table 5, we can identify a psychological effect of the programme 
showing that Juntos has a stronger effect for beneficiary children who, after the start 
of the programme, feel included in the community and at school with respect to 
children who feel stigma.  
 
Table 5: Stigma Mechanism 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (level of 
education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Children with inclusion index below the median, with controls 
Juntos -0.110 -0.110 0.002 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.241) 
N 47 47 44 
 
Children with inclusion index above the median, with controls 
Juntos 0.154** 0.158** 0.208** 
 (0.133) (0.114) (0.123) 
N 203 204 183 
P-value for difference 0.5643              0.7296 0.8612 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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For children for which stigma persist even after the programme implementation and 
inclusion is low, Juntos is not able to significantly affect aspirations. Conversely, for 
children who do not suffer from stigma the programme significantly and positively 
affects aspirations. Therefore, the programme impact seems to be mediated by a 
psychosocial mechanism but not by the economic mechanism.  
Additionally, we analyse whether there are other heterogeneous programme effects 
due to other children characteristics, such as sex and area of residence (See Appendix 
3.5). We find that the programme has a stronger effect on girls, however coefficients 
are not significantly different from those of boys. We do not find that the programme 
differently affects children living in urban or rural areas. 
a. Long Term Programme Effect 
Finally, we use Round 4 to assess the long-term impact of the programme over time 
and the robustness of our results. In particular, using outcome variables from Round 
4, we compare older cohort children who are beneficiaries in both Round 3 and Round 
4 against children who were never beneficiaries. Using outcome and control variables 
from Round 4 we confirm results from our main estimation and show that there is a 
sustained impact of the programme over time. This finding is in line with Bernard et 
al. (2017) who show that the effect of an “aspirational documentary” persisted even 
five years after the intervention. Table 6 reveals that there is not only a short-term 
effect of being part of the programme but the psychosocial effect persists along the 
years and this may have concrete implications in terms of human capital investment 
and educational outcomes (Serneels and Dercon, 2014; Chiapa et al. 2012). 
 
Table 6: Impact of Juntos on Education and Work Aspirations-Round 4 (with 
controls) 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (level of 
education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Juntos 0.149 
(0.279) 
0.213*** 
(0.126) 
0.200* 
(0.157) 
N 196 199 157 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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7. Robustness check 
To check the robustness of our results, we implement different tests. First, we apply 
Propensity Score Matching estimations using three different methods of matching 
(namely: Nearest Neighbor; Stratification; Kernel matching) to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated. Both the results of the main estimation (showed in 
Table 2) and the cohort effect are confirmed in Table 7.  
Table 7: Average Treatment effect on the Treated  
 Children 
educational 
aspirations 
(Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations  
(Level of 
education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
 
Children job 
aspirations 
 
 Older Cohort Older Cohort Both Cohorts Older Cohort 
Nearest Neighbor 
Matching method 
(random draw 
version) 
0.468* 
(0.284) 
 
0.385* 
(0.192) 
0.025 
(0.111) 
0.517***         
(0.193) 
Stratification method 0.415*** 
(0.109) 
0.300*** 
(0.092) 
0.031 
(0.090) 
0.276* 
(0.153) 
Kernel Matching 
method  
(Bootstrapped 
standard errors) 
0.405** 
(0.198) 
0.309* 
(0.159) 
0.009 
(0.089) 
0.277 * 
(0.157) 
ATT; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As a second robustness check, we implement the OLS analysis with IPW for the older 
cohort sample trimmed according to the probability of being selected by the 
programme. We exclude from the sample people with a probability of being selected 
by the programme lower than 0.15% and with a probability higher than 0.95%. 
Trimming the sample, we exclude beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with very 
different probability of being selected by the programme, so we perform the analysis 
on a sample with a very similar probability of being selected by the programme. In 
Table 8, we show that results are robust to this test and that the programme positively 
and significantly affects children aspirations related to education and work. 
Additionally, performing the analysis on the pooled sample for both cohorts in round 
3 and round 4 and clustering errors at individual level, we confirm the robustness of 
our results on educational aspirations (see Appendix 3.6).  
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Table 8: Impact of Juntos on Education and Work Aspirations-Trimmed 
Sample (with controls) 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Juntos 0.158** 
(0.137) 
0.175** 
(0.123) 
0.204** 
(0.113) 
N 112 112 103 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; Errors are clustered at the community level; 
The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to test whether the Peruvian conditional cash transfer 
programme, Juntos, affects children aspirations related to education and future work 
opportunities. The literature on this topic is very scarce and recent. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper analysing the impact of the Peruvian programme on 
aspirations and trying to analyse the economic and psychosocial mechanisms behind 
it. Our results show that the programme positively and significantly affect children 
educational aspirations. Conversely, for work aspirations we identify a cohort effect, 
showing that the programme has a significant impact on adolescents work aspirations 
but not on younger children aspirations. This result is in line with the idea that people 
form their aspirations step-by-step (Dalton et al. 2016). Children focus first on 
education and then on work, once the first objective is fixed, they start to create new 
aspirations for the following step. We test two main mechanisms through which 
conditional cash transfers may affect aspirations: the economic channel and the 
programme inclusion channel. We do not identify an economic mechanism, since we 
find that the programme does not differently affect children whose wealth index at 
the baseline is above or below the median of the distribution. Conversely, we can 
identify a psychosocial effect: the programme has a significant impact on children 
who, after the start of the programme, are highly included at school and in the 
community but not on children who perceive stigma and feel excluded within their 
usual context. Finally, the programme has a sustained impact over time and a stronger 
effect on girls than on boys.  There is evidence that aspirations about education and 
future work may concretely affect current individuals’ preferences for school, years 
of schooling and educational attainment. Showing that conditional cash transfers may 
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affect aspirations confirms their well acknowledged role in affecting schooling and 
investments in human capital, not only through conditionalities but also by acting on 
people aspirations. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.1 
Table 3.1: Variables about aspirations and coding 
Indicator Question Coded 
CHILDREN 
Education 
Aspiration 
(Years) 
Q. “Imagine you had no constraints and 
could study for as long as you liked, or 
go back to school if you have already 
left. What level of formal education 
would you like to complete?” 
 
[Coded as years of education: 
years of school= (0-11); Complete 
Technical College=12; Complete 
University=13] 
Education 
Aspiration 
(Level of 
education) 
Q. “Imagine you had no constraints and 
could study for as long as you liked, or 
go back to school if you have already 
left. What level of formal education 
would you like to complete?” 
 
[Coded as completed level of 
education: 0=None; 1=Primary; 
2=Secondary; 3=Complete 
Technical College; 4=Complete 
University] 
Work 
Aspiration 
(three 
categories) 
Q. “What do you want to be when you 
grow up?” 
 
[Coded as: 1=low aspirations; 
2=Intermediate aspirations; 
3=High aspirations] 
 
Appendix 3.2 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on aspirations (Round 3) 
 Older Cohort Younger Cohort 
 Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries 
Children job 
aspirations 
2.793 
(0.547) 
2.845 
(0.497) 
2.697 
(0.683) 
2.352 
(0.888) 
Observations 179 71 512 330 
Children educational 
aspirations (Years) 
12.72 
(0.984) 
12.78 
(0.580) 
  
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level of 
education) 
3.775 
(0.630) 
3.784 
(0.580) 
  
Observations 200 74   
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses 
Variables coding are defined in Table 3.1 
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Appendix 3.3 
Table 3.2: Propensity Score Estimates 
 Juntos  
 (Beneficiary=1 in Round 3) 
Area of residence (rural=1) 0.112 
 (0.119) 
  
Percentage of households reporting crimes in each 
community  
-0.345*** 
(1.003) 
  
  
Percentage of stunted children in the community 0.717*** 
 (0.410) 
  
Presence of children under 7 (at baseline) 
within the household 
0.187 
(0.372) 
  
  
Wealth index -1.363*** 
 (0.351) 
  
Household size 0.146 
 (0.0220) 
  
Caregiver is literate=1 -0.256* 
 (0.111) 
  
Child age -0.489 
 (0.0975) 
  
Child sex (Male=1) -0.011 
 (0.0959) 
  
Spoken language (Spanish) -0.755*** 
 (0.129) 
  
Child Age Cohort (Younger Cohort=1) -0.240 
 (0.674) 
N 1,151 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix 3.4 
The focus of our paper is on children aspirations, however we also show some result 
about parents aspirations, since children and parents aspirations are positively 
correlated (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Correlation between parents and children aspirations 
 
 
Parents are asked to answer to the following questions: “Ideally what level of formal 
education would you like child to complete?”; “What job would you most like child to do 
in the future”. 
PARENTS 
Education 
Aspiration 
(Years) 
Q. “Ideally what level of formal 
education would you like child to 
complete?” 
[Coded as years of education: 
years of school=(0-11); Complete 
Technical College=12; Complete 
University=13] 
Education 
Aspiration 
(Level of 
education) 
Q. “Ideally what level of formal 
education would you like child to 
complete?” 
[Coded as completed level of 
education: 0=None; 1=Primary; 
2=Secondary; 3=Complete 
Technical College; 4=Complete 
University] 
Work 
Aspiration 
(three 
categories) 
Q. “What job would you most like child 
to do in the future” 
[Coded as: 1=low aspirations; 
2=Intermediate aspirations; 
3=High aspirations] 
 
We do not find a significant programme impact on parents’ aspirations (see Table 4). 
For parents, the ethnicity seems to be an important predictor of aspirations while 
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regression coefficients of Table 2 reveal that for children this is not an important 
component in forming aspirations. This result is in line with Pasquier-Doumer and 
Risso Brandon (2015) who found that indigenous children do not internalize racial 
scheme for their opportunities. Also, household head age is not a significant 
predictors of children aspirations while the opposite happens for parents.  
 
Table 3.4: Impact of Juntos on Education and Work Parents Aspirations 
 Parents educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Parents 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Parents job 
aspirations for 
children 
Juntos 0.053 
(0.178) 
0.024 
(0.107) 
0.066 
(0.0540) 
    
Wealth index 0.249** 
(1.045) 
0.236*** 
(0.481) 
0.196** 
(0.348) 
    
Area of residence 
(rural=1) 
-0.040 
(0.138) 
-0.052 
(0.113) 
-0.054 
(0.0669) 
    
Household head years of 
education 
0.020 
(0.0206) 
0.044 
(0.0117) 
0.026 
(0.00637) 
    
Household head age -0.211** 
(0.0128) 
-0.165** 
(0.00503) 
-0.107 
(0.00373) 
    
Child sex (Male=1) -0.086 
(0.190) 
-0.069 
(0.0883) 
-0.179*** 
(0.0792) 
    
Ethnicity (White=1) 0.054*** 
(0.175) 
0.069*** 
(0.108) 
0.030 
(0.162) 
    
Child's age - in months 0.156 
(0.0241) 
0.407 
(0.0100) 
0.569 
(0.00744) 
    
Household size 0.038 
(0.0601) 
-0.043 
(0.0316) 
-0.043 
(0.0228) 
    
Dependency ratio -0.145* 
(0.00172) 
-0.119* 
(0.000703) 
-0.065 
(0.000597) 
    
Child Age Cohort 
(Younger Cohort=1) 
0.203 
(2.136) 
0.467 
(0.878) 
0.619 
(0.632) 
N 1,083 1,085 1,048 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 3.5 
 
Table 3.5.A: Heterogeneous Effects by Child Sex 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations 
(Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Aspirations: Girls, with controls  
Juntos 0.234** 0.256*** 0.246*** 
 (0.223) (0.130) (0.124) 
N 133 133 125 
 
Aspirations: Boys, with controls 
Juntos 0.064 0.029 0.088 
 (0.200) (0.177) (0.199) 
N 117 118 102 
P-value for difference 0.2162 0.1256 0.8602 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 3.5.B: Heterogenous Effect by Area 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations 
(Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Aspirations: Rural sample, with controls  
Juntos 0.161** 0.152 0.182* 
 (0.179) (0.172) (0.169) 
N 94 95 84 
 
Aspirations: Urban sample, with controls 
Juntos -0.004 -0.004 0.276** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.0327) 
N 156 156 143 
P-value for difference 0.2610 0.4059 0.5175 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 3.6 
Table 3.6: Impact of Juntos on Education and Work Aspirations – Pooled Sample 
 Children 
educational 
aspirations (Years) 
Index-Children 
educational 
aspirations (Level 
of education) 
Children job 
aspirations 
Juntos 0.066 
(0.110) 
0.106** 
(0.0804) 
0.069 
(0.0822) 
    
Wealth index 0.108* 
(0.483) 
0.102* 
(0.325) 
0.083 
(0.285) 
    
Area of residence 
(rural=1) 
-0.033 
(0.0956) 
-0.010 
(0.0882) 
-0.114** 
(0.0756) 
    
Household head years of 
education 
0.160*** 
(0.0111) 
0.224*** 
(0.00960) 
0.035 
(0.00941) 
    
Household head age -0.006 
(0.00525) 
-0.009 
(0.00377) 
0.061 
(0.00371) 
    
Child sex (Male=1) 0.070 
(0.0952) 
0.049 
(0.0693) 
-0.116*** 
(0.0618) 
    
Ethnicity (White=1) -0.079 
(0.718) 
-0.052 
(0.368) 
-0.037 
(0.149) 
    
Child's age - in months -0.152 
(0.0125) 
-0.071 
(0.00882) 
0.539 
(0.00889) 
    
Household size 0.002 
(0.0286) 
-0.062 
(0.0195) 
-0.021 
(0.0176) 
    
Dependency ratio -0.020 
(0.000722) 
-0.065 
(0.000646) 
-0.060 
(0.000561) 
    
Child Age Cohort 
(Younger Cohort=1) 
-0.037 
(1.060) 
0.214 
(0.765) 
0.434 
(0.766) 
    
Year Dummy (Round4=1) -0.082 
(0.635) 
-0.265 
(0.467) 
-0.243 
(0.435) 
N 1,089 1,095 1,664 
Standardized beta coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
Errors are clustered at the community level; The propensity score is introduced as weights in the regression 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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